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Abstract 
This paper is about the role and the future of the nation. They are analysed 
in the context of current development of international integration. The 
starting point is theoretical, which is based on the proposal of a more 
comprehensive, extended and organic version of integration theory than 
that suggested by mainstream schools. It considers international integration 
as a complex and multi-dimensional process, which is composed primarily 
of the global and interstate regional integrations (e.g., EU and ASEAN). The 










Эта статья о роли и будущем нации. Они анализируются в контексте 
современного развития международной интеграции. Отправная точка - 
теоретическая, основанная на предложении более всеобъемлющей, 
расширенной и органичной версии теории интеграции, чем та, которую 
предлагают обычные школы. Она рассматривает международную 




основном из глобальных и межгосударственных региональных 
интеграций (например, ЕС и АСЕАН), в то время как интеграции на 
национальном уровне остаются основными компонентами процесса. 
 
I. On National Integration 
 
Theoretical frameworks 
A semantic interpretation of integration presents no particular 
difficulty. Expressed in the most general way, integration is a process of 
unification and amalgamation, the merging of parts into a whole, becoming 
a unit, fitting together, melting into one another, linking up. It can be 
understood as the cooperation of the parts, the harmonization of their 
operation, their reciprocal influence and their interconnectedness and 
interdependence.  There is a large literature defining the integration along 
these lines. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of integration as unification or 
merging together is rather superficial, and means more-or-less quantitative 
approach. Therefore, I prefer to choose the more extended and 
comprehensive version, i.e., a qualitative definition. The dual character of 
the concept of integration should be stressed from the beginning. There is a 
broad agreement in the theories that integration can and should be 
conceived as a process and a state of affairs. In short, by social sciences’ 
terminology, I propose to define integration as a process of creation, 
development, transformation and reproduction of different type of 
community based social organisms. As human communities, they can take 
the form of socio-economic, political, cultural, spiritual, or any type of social 
entities. Integration, as a state of affairs, qualitatively represents 
evolving/emerging/functioning socio-economic organisms of expanding 
potentials, rendering and providing widening range of functions and 
services. During the history, they structurally and functionally became 
increasingly complex; and in terms of their performance more efficient. Our 
focus is primarily on political and economic integration, and we refrain from 
analysing of community/integration concepts of other sciences like 
anthropology, biology, ethology, or mathematics. 
There is no integration/community without purpose; it offers a wide 




costs as well. Integration does make sense, if advantages (benefits) exceed 
disadvantages (costs). “We have argued that the benefits of a larger 
community must outweigh the costs before people will form one, or join an 
existing one.”1  The other condition is that the benefits should be ‘fairly’ 
distributed, based on a broad range of interest harmonization and 
coordination. „It is important for the community, that all of its members get a 
share from the acquired goods, because the community can survive only 
this way, although it is possible that in a given situation only one or some 
people produced all of these something available for consumption. There 
are several rituals, rules, which regulate the distribution of goods. Real 
community can evolve and operate normally only, if its members are ready 
to place their personal interests behind the community interests.”2  
Integration is understood as a historical process, it seems evident to 
claim that this process did not begin recently (i.e., a few decades ago). The 
history of integration started many thousands of years ago, with the very 
first families that lived in tribes, in villages and later organised in cities, 
nations or – more recently – global society. As a result, we can extend our 
theoretical analysis into historical dimensions. 
The integration is historically determined process; it is embedded into 
the given socio-economic structures. In these respects, there are two 
factors, which play an important role, and give the framework and character 
of integration at all of its stages: 
1. Techno-structures, technical bases, infrastructures;   
2. Character of social and power relations and socio-economic 
stratification (property, social controls and distribution). 
I refrain from discussing the generalized and in many respects 
simplified five basic social formations of Marxism. I particularly reject the 
ideas of any historical “spiral”, which indicate the return of the primitive 
communism into a “modern” communistic society. In reality, during many 
thousand years of human history, we experienced thousands of social 
formations, existing parallel or following one after another. While they can 
be sharply differentiated, they overlapped or complexly interacted, both in 
time and in space. 
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The generalization on integration, in these respects, can be 
considered as a special dimension of human history: 
1. Hunting and gathering archaic nomadic societies with families and 
tribes as community frameworks; 
2. Agrarian societies, based on slavery or feudal relations, settling in 
villages or cities, often expanding into larger imperial states; 
3. Industrial revolution – capitalism – and national integration; 
4. Information and communication society – global capitalism – 
international integration. 
Certainly, this historical arch is fairly rude and superficial, and several 
other stages and framework of the historical development of humankind can 
be suggested. 
The questions, which immediately arise: how the integration 
processes evolve into different levels of integratedness; and at which point 
and under what conditions can we speak about the emergence of an 
integrated organism? Answers to these questions can be sought by 
applying a structural analysis of the integration process along its main 
components.  
Due to the complexity of the issue, I propose to define these 
components, primarily along the dimensions of socio-economic structures 
or formations: 
• Intensity, depth and structure of division of labour (trinity of 
cooperation, specialization and competition); intensity of cooperation 
(trade and communication); interconnectedness – interdependence 
(related indicators give picture about the level and state of real-
economic integration); 
• Regulatory frameworks, system of social, economic or political 
governance (rule obedience, market coordination, institutions and 
policies); 
• Socio-economic, cultural or emotional (spiritual) cohesion, solidarity 
and interest harmonization;  
• Identity or identification, myth, believes (religion), devotion or loyalty 
to the given community; 
• Culture of the community (rules, norms, values, symbols). 




the state of any integration can be made along these attributes and related 
parameters. It seems that is would be reasonable if we make a distinction 
between forms of looser organizations and integrated organisms. In pre-
integration stages, the cooperation can take looser organizational forms, 
while by intensification of the cooperation this can evolve to organisms 
meeting the criteria of integration. 
At first, attention by integration theories and policies was mostly given 
to political and economic integration, and primarily to Europe. For political 
communities, the major aim was peace and security. An ideal “political 
community” can be defined “as one in which there are limitations on the 
violence of group conflicts.” 3  Satisfactory, effective and democratic 
governance came only later. 
In economic terms, the increase of efficiency and welfare were 
considered as the major priorities: first as the optimization of the division of 
labour and trade (see Viner on trade creation and trade diversion), and later 
on as the global or regional optimization of the allocation of resources and 
production. Integration organisations growingly have become service 
providers. Discussions on social, cultural and other aspects started only 
subsequently. 
Integration is a highly structured process. In general, the formation of 
different sets of organisms or communities is a multi-layered, multi-levelled, 
multi-functional and multi-dimensional process. The integration as 
community-formation covers a great number of integrating communities 
converging into a unified whole. These communities are in the process of 
continuous integration (re-integration); nevertheless, they also co-exist with 
one another. They are overlapping, interacting and interdependent. In every 
society; there is a great variety of such communities, but their number and 
complexity tends to grow in parallel with socio-economic development. 
They cannot be separated; the process, performance or success of 
integration is dependent on all of its components.  
Integration can be either an enforced or an organic process. 
Historically, it is a combination of both. Enforced integration is the 
characteristic of an oppressive society, while organic integration is related 
to democratic processes. Enforced integration is imposed upon society by 
                                                          




community rules or individual persons, through the operation of the state or 
the market; it might be based on tradition or physical or subjective 
constraints. Community formation can be enforced by several external 
factors. One such typical factor is a defence against external threats 
(invaders) or disasters (wild animals, fires, floods, hurricanes or 
earthquakes), either on a permanent or an occasional basis.  
On the other hand, organic integration is based on internal driving 
forces; it is a structured process with close interaction between the different 
components. Organic integration is characterised by coherence, and it is 
performance-oriented. The organic concept of integration places questions 
into context; it raises issues in their complexity. Organic integrations 
presuppose democratic decision-making and the normal functioning of 
market forces. The proportions and relations of organic and enforced 
elements of integration have constantly changed throughout history. It might 
be claimed that the foregrounding of organic factors (and the subsequent 
backgrounding of enforced elements) are more characteristic of 
contemporary integration processes. 
In general, integration is a multi-actor process; nevertheless, 
individual human agents are viewed as the primary and the principal actors 
of integration. The history of mankind is the organisation of individuals in 
different communities. According to the organic concept of integration, 
individuals are free to act as they wish, and thus associate and unite 
voluntarily and democratically, in harmony with their will and interests. 
Depending on the composition of different communities, the role of 
individuals can be direct or indirect. In a broader integration process, the 
community as a whole, particularly in legal terms, can play the role of 
principal actor. This is the case even if communities only act as secondary 
agents, since in the end they represent the peoples of the particular 
community itself.  
In the contractual integration of the EU, the nation states 
(governments) have been regarded as the principal actors, and in legal 
terms, the main institutions and decision-making processes have been 
shaped accordingly. From the point of view of recognition of individuals as 
political and legal actors, the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in 2000 (binding on EU countries since 2009) was an important 
milestone. Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights as basic European values, were embedded in the 




children, minorities and displaced persons; opposing the death penalty, 
torture, human trafficking and discrimination; defending civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. Formally, from points of view of 
recognition of the legal status of individuals, the European citizenship and 
the right to vote in the direct elections of the European Parliament were 
important steps. 
The term multi-functionality characterises all communities or social 
organizations. Families are primarily biological communities for bringing up 
children, but they are also welfare communities, cultural communities (in the 
sense of teaching the mother tongue or acting as the bedrock of moral 
values) or security communities. As any other communities, families have 
fundamentally changed during the history. The functions of nations are 
more complicated and cover all the main fields of social life. International 
integration puts this issue into even broader contexts. 
The integration is based on division of labour, or exchange of 
activities. They can be direct or indirect, which mark different levels of 
integration. 
The main framework of direct (natural) exchange of activities are 
families (in economic terms: households) or workshops, factories or any 
type (cultural, social or sport) organisations. Historically, in nomad and 
agricultural societies, direct production integration was closely linked to 
families, tribes or other small organizations (guilds). The industrial 
revolution brought the birth of modern production organisations, such as 
manufactures or factories. Simply put, in this case, we can speak about 
micro-integration. According to ethology, due to their size, mutual devotion 
and intimacy of relations, in fact, these types of social frameworks can be 
considered as “real communities”.  
The exchanges of activities can be indirect, which are transmitted 
through market mechanisms and money.  At a certain stage of human 
development, the market becomes a basic form of social organization, 
which already transcends classical “community” relations. Market as a set 
of indirect relations, is the basic framework and form of macro-integration. 
The market was an important factor of promoting abstract thinking and of 
the birth and development of Homo sapiens. The man, among others, is a 
trading animal. 




approach needs precision and extension. Several fields of integration fell 
outside of them, or have mixed character. There are spheres and sectors, 
where the individual’s participation and operation are both direct and 
indirect character. These spheres or sectors have intermediary or 
transmission roles. To mark them, I decided to introduce the notion of 
mezzo-integration.  
Accordingly, the recent integration processes can be structured in the 
following way: 
Macro-integration: 
• International integration: global integration and interstate 
regional integration; 
• National integration; 
Mezzo-integration: 
• Transnational company networks;  
• Global city networks; 
• Religions - churches. 
Micro-integration: 
• Families; 
• Workshops, factories and individual companies in the 
different fields of socio-economic activities, 
• Political, socio-economic associations, NGOs, civil 
organisations or great number of informal associations. 
Market actors strive for gain (profit), therefore, they are efficiency 
oriented. Gains, however, can be obtained from breaking the community 
rules. Therefore, the market should operate on the basis of moral, legal and 
democratic principles. This assumes broad legal and social regulation. 
Beyond efficiency, economy should render a broad range of functions, let 
they serve social, environmental, security or any other objectives. These 
are the main reasons, why markets always should be directed and 
regulated. Markets exist under special social conditions; the character, the 
forms and the depth of regulation are determined by these given conditions. 
The normal operation of the market largely depends on the quality of that 




Economic integration, therefore, starts with integration of markets, 
which assumes a broad range of liberalization as first steps. But due to the 
above circumstances, they, from the beginning, assume broad elements of 
regulation. It is not by surprising, that one of the basic distinctions of 
integration theories is between market and policy integration.  
The difference between market liberalization, the removal of “artificial 
barriers”, and the integration of economic policies is expressed by Jan 
Tinbergen through the introduction of the concept of negative and positive 
integration. “It appears useful to make a distinction between negative and 
positive integration. By the former we mean measures consisting of the 
abolition of a number of impediments to the proper operation of an 
integrated area. By the latter we mean the creation of new institutions and 
their instruments or modification of existing instruments.”4 Thus, “negative” 
integration simply equals liberalization, whereas “positive integration” is 
concerned with institution-building, referring partly to the development of 
new institutions and mechanisms, and partly to the modification of existing 
mechanisms and policies. 
In the last about half a century, the major components of international 
integration are the interstate regional integrations.  According to WTO data, 
there are dozens of them (ASEAN, Mercosur, etc.), which can range from 
free trade areas to economic unions. With some few exceptions (such as 
North Korea or Cuba) all of the ca. 200 countries of the world participate in 
at least one regional integration organisation. 
There are several attempts to measure integration, both in its global 
(Globalization Indices – KOF or Ernst and Young) or regional dimensions (a 
project of “indicator-based monitoring of regional economic integration” – 
supported by UNU-CRIS, Bruges). Several years ago we proposed a 
methods of measurement, which we called drawing “integration profiles”. By 
it, we tried to avoid primarily the constraints of averaging and aggregating 
parameters, which were necessary for making rankings among the 
countries. What we attempted was rather creation of a picture, which based 
on several mosaics of information, and can be composed in a way of 
making this picture relevant and instructive. And instead of strict rankings, 
through these mosaics, we created clusters which then can be put together 
as mosaics of a larger picture.  
                                                          




The drawing of integration profiles was proposed in four dimensions: 
1. Real economic integration (integratedness); 2. Institutional and regulatory 
integration; 3. Comparative performances; and 4. Convergence and 
divergence. Later, we succeed to draw this picture in some dimensions and 
for some regions (Hungary and Central Europe). But a broader and more 
complex testing of the method failed for financial (acquiring financial 
resources for collecting large amount of statistical data and information) and 
technical (bringing together a larger staff) reasons. 
 For our present analysis, we use our study about Central Europe and 
Hungary, and focusing only on real economic integration.5 In this study we 
chose seven parameters: 
• “Trade integration: flows, stocks, intensity; 
• Structure of trade relations;  
• Sub-regional concentration and interconnectedness; 
• Intra-sector trade, place in value chains; 
• Factor integration: flows, stocks, intensity; 
• State and characteristics of financial integration; 
• Transnational company sectors.”6  
 
On the basis of scoring countries along these parameters, we ranked the 
countries (on a 100 per cent scale) into five clusters (extremely high, high, 
medium, low and no integration). “If the trade share in GDP is bellow 10%, 
it indicates no external dependence, as structurally closed economy, and 
lack of intensity. We propose to speak about low intensity between 10-30%, 
medium intensity between 30-50%, high intensity between 50-70%, and 
very high intensity (dependence and openness) above 70%.This scaling 
can be of course disputed, but in accordance with literature, we accept 10% 
as a minimum dependency threshold, and 50% as a high dependence 
threshold”.7  
 
In a summarising study for the EU, “the data indicated a high level of real-
integration among the majority of EU members. Out of the 27countries, 20 
fall into this category.” 
In the “extremely highly integrated” category, there are 8, mostly small 
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developed core and some East-Central Europe countries (AU, CZ, EE, HU, 
IE, LU, NL and SK). In the “highly integrated” are 12 large and some of the 
small developed countries. 
The “medium level integrated” 7 countries come from the South of the EU 
(EL, CY, PT and ML), the 2 Baltic countries (LT and LV), and Bulgaria. In 
some cases, the performance can be low or marginal (the trade integration 
of Cyprus or Greece).8 On the whole, there are no EU countries in the low 
and the no integration category. On the other hand, one can note that in 
other interstate regional integrations, the trade integration intensity falls into 
the low category. 
In terms of institutional and regulatory terms, the 19 members of the 
Eurozone qualify for high level integration.  
The EU, with its high integratedness, is in unique position: 1) it is 
based on a high intensity of relations, interconnectedness and relatively 
balanced interdependences; 2) it is the only form of integration with a tight-
knit, complex single internal market and a single currency (the 19 members 
possessing 77% of the total GDP of the EU); 3) it has extended the 
principle of cohesion to the level of the Union; 4) it commands certain 
political identity (polity) with several elements of supra-nationality; 5) it 
aspires to becoming a global power; and 6) the EU is considered as a 
model for regional integration.  
Presently, global integration can be considered as the other major 
novel phenomenon of international integration. I do not wish to take a 
position with regard to the history of globalisation. I would not like to 
question the global outstretch of large historical empires such as the 
Mongols or the Romans, either. There are also convincing arguments about 
dating the globalisation process from the discovery of America or the 
industrial revolution. What is important here is that in the decades following 
World War II, globalisation turned into global integration. I agree with David 
Held distinguishing four main stages of globalisation: pre-modern 
globalisation (9-11 thousand years); early modern globalisation (1500-
1850), modern globalisation (1850-1945); and contemporary globalisation 
(after 1945).9 According to my opinion, global integration is related to this 
latest “contemporary” phase of globalisation. Thus, what is really new here 
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is global integration and not globalisation.  
The relationship between global integration and globalisation has 
been broadly analysed, but in general, most of the international literature 
fails to make a clear distinction between the two. „The economic 
understanding of globalization sees process as an essential feature. The 
term is associated with activity of integration and transformation. An 
interesting, though unresolved, question is the extent to which there is a 
global end-point, where the process of change ends and a truly global 
economic system exists. Economic interpretations see globalization as a 
process that involves the integration of once-discrete markets into a 
broader system of relations where geographic and political constraints have 
diminishing significance for the allocation of resources. Under globalization, 
resources are distributed through the exchange of goods and services, the 
movement of capital in search of return, and the relocation of peoples 
pursuing employment and material advancement, all eased by the rapid 
flow of knowledge and information.”10  
Globalisation as integration is more explicitly defined by J. N. 
Bhagwati: „Economic globalization constitutes integration of national 
economies into the international economy through trade, direct investment 
(by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international 
flow of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology.”11 Global 
integration is basically market integration, exerting an impact on all sectors 
of social life. “Globalization is defined in what follows as integration of 
economic activities, via markets. The driving forces are technological and 
policy changes – falling costs of transport and communication and greater 
reliance on market forces. The economic globalization discussed here has 
cultural, social and political consequences (and preconditions).”12 “By many 
standards, then economic integration had become a hallmark of 
globalization, deliberately promoted by governments, corporations, and 
international organizations alike.”13  
Equating globalisation with global integration has been, however, 
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criticised by some of the scholars. D. Held, discussing the issue, points out 
the following: „Integration too has a very specific meaning since it refers to 
processes of economic and political unification which prefigure a sense of 
community, shared fortunes and shared institutions of governance. As 
previously noted, the notion of globalization as the precursor to a single world 
society and community is deeply flawed.”14 
 
Nevertheless, globalisation has been regarded as a process and not as 
a fait accompli by the vast majority of the scholarly literature. It can hardly be 
denied as a process, while integration as a state of affairs, especially on a 
global level, is still lacking in many ways (this applies in many respects to 
regional integrations as well); and only the foundations have been laid down 
at this point. Global integration is still asymmetric in nature and it has not 
fulfilled its any major properties. „Today, at the beginning of the third 
millennium, the world economy has not yet reached the state of national 
economic integration even of a normally developed capitalist country (having 
no unified labour market, and even in the international flow of capital and 
goods there are still obstacles).” 15  Globalisation is burdened by serious 
contradictions, which can be the source of dangerous conflicts. 
 
By international integration the national integration processes enter 
into a new stage. Internationalisation of national economies, started right 
from the beginning of national integration already about 2-3 hundred years 
ago, but this internationalisation recently became highly intensive. National 
and world markets developed hand in hand; of course, their relations were 
differing depending on the level of development, size and structures of 
economies. 
The new quality of relations among nations can be defined as 
integration. The process, however, has external and internal dimensions. 
Besides the external integration of nations, it assumes internal adjustment, 
transformation and re-integration. In the age of international integration, 
these external and internal dimensions give the dual character of national 
integration processes. In regulatory terms, that is nothing else than 
alignments of the two basic elements (“legs”) of multi-level governance 
structures (national and international). The understanding this duality of 
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external and internal dimensions of national integration is a strategic issue 
from the points of view of development and long-term consolidation of the 
whole European integration process.  
 
 
Birth and development of national states 
Historically, there were great variety of roads, how the present nations 
have been created. But in this respect, we have to make a distinction 
between creation of national states and the emergence and development of 
national integration processes. The two are closely related, and mutually 
dependent on each other. But we have to distinguish between acquiring 
independent legal status (statehood) on the one hand and the process of 
national integration on the other hand.  
Historically, no doubt, that in emergence of nations the existence and 
development of state frameworks played a crucial role. „As due to 
enlightenment, the consciousness on nationality in Europe began to spread, 
and it penetrated into politics. Only the state offered for it broad space of 
operation. There was quite large difference between peoples, who were 
reached by the nationalizing wave of enlightenment, living in independent 
and unified state, and those, where the state organization was still 
missing.”16 The famous Hungarian historian formulates the importance of 
state framework more poetically by saying:  “Without state we are, nor 
people, neither nation, only – dissolved sheaf – today, scattered chaff – 
tomorrow.”17 
The creation and emergence of modern nation states is product of a 
long and complex historical process. It was widely determined by the socio-
economic development of different peoples. “In the author’s view, the 
national idea has been an integration ideology which has emerged in most 
European countries in the last third of the 18th century.”18  These types of 
state frameworks were secured already in the second half of the18th century 
in France, but in case of Germany and Italy only a century later. 
Many of the present nation states have their identifiable historical, 
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medieval ancestors (city states, principalities, kingdoms or empires), but 
there are some newcomers. “My point of view is “modernist” (that is, it 
supposes that “the nation” has emerged in the process of modernization), 
but I have to emphasize that very often the idea of nation and the practice, 
the policies, the institutions which refer to the nation have premodern 
antecedents (for example, in the case of Catalan, Irish, Polish, and 
Hungarian nationalism).”19The modernization meant not only technological 
progress or economic restructuring, but it covered the social and cultural 
spheres or the institutions and governance as well. 
The popular historian dates nations much earlier, their roots reaching 
down deeply in the history of emerging the Babel of written cultures of 
communities speaking different languages: “humanity has a very long 
history and nationalism has been around for just a short period out of it. 
Humans have existed for more then two million years, Homo sapiens 200 
thousand years old. Human culture is 17 thousand years old. Nations 
appeared maybe 5000 years ago. And if you look at today's nations, no 
nation today has existed five thousand years ago. And no nation today will 
exist five thousand years from now. So in the long duration of time, and of 
human time, nations are an ephemeral phenomenon. Still, in the present 
day, it’s a very important phenomenon.”20 Taking the perspectives of the 
global community speaking only one language, it is far away enough not the 
care to much about the future of the nation. 
 The Hungarian state was established in 1000, and by crowning 
Stephen I., it gained full international recognition. The country, in the more 
than 500 years was one of the leading powers of Europe (till 1526). In the 
next about 460 years, the country lost its sovereignty, due to the Turkish 
occupation (for 150 years), and later in varying degrees it was limited due to 
Habsburg, German or Soviet rule or control. The country could restore its 
full sovereignty only after 1990. And then, she immediately started 
intensively integrating and sharing sovereignty with the European Union. 
The detailed analysis of history of nations (in most cases also troubled), is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The official international recognition of nation states dates back to the 
1648 Westphalian system. International recognition is a crucial element of 
their existence. „A new state becomes a real state, and actor of the 
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international life, only when this state or formation, which declare itself as a 
state, acquires the recognition of the main actors of the international life, 
which naturally today and for a long time in the future are states, namely the 
other most influential states, the big powers and the neighbours.”21 The 
position of excluded countries depends on their strength and importance 
(Taiwan), and for some (Kosovo or Ossetia), the non-recognition is a 
serious limiting factor. 
The emergence of the nation states on the American continent and in 
Western Europe largely was completed by the end of the19th century. The 
USA as a modern nation state was consolidated after the civil war in the 
1860s, and the same applied to Canada, which obtained dominion status in 
1867. The independent Latin-American states emerged during the 19th 
century, after their successful independence wars. The parallel creation of 
national markets, monies, infrastructural developments or cultural and 
social cohesions, all prove that these countries can be considered 
nationally integrated, although if they achieved it on diverging degrees. 
In Western Europe, the process was marked by the Italian (1861) and 
the German unification (1871), and the nation state building had been 
consolidated by the end of the 19th century. In fact, in this respect the only 
remarkable developments, which occurred in the 20th century, where the 
dissolution of the Norwegian-Swedish Union in 1905, and the United 
Kingdom-Ireland separation in 1921. 
We do not venture into the analysis of Asian national developments, 
but by the end of the 19th century, Japan also can be considered as an 
integrated nation state. The same applies to Australia and New Zealand. 
The majority of the present about 200 nation states in the world were 
created during the 20th century in three major waves: after the First, then 
the Second World War, in the process of decolonization and recently after 
1990 due to the collapse of Soviet type of regimes. 
In 1914, there were only 65 independent states in the world (26 in 
Europe, 22 in America, 8 in Asia, 3 in Africa and 3 in Oceania). At present, 
on the planet called Earth, there are about 200 independent states, which 
are partly or fully recognised internationally. (The number of UN members is 
193.). From them, 3 were created recently after 2000 (East Timor in 2002; 
                                                          




Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011). Kosovo is recognised only by 
60% of the UN members, and it is not yet the member of the United 
Nations.  
Such countries as Taiwan, North Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Puntland, State of Somalia or Dniester Republic 
(Transnistria) have only limited international recognition.  
Among the people fighting for their independent state, particularly the 
Kurds and the Palestinians have to be mentioned. But in foreseeable future 
only the Palestinians have some chance for that. The independence or 
autonomy of the Kurdish people is a more complicated issue, they are 
dispersed in about half a dozen neighbouring countries, and their future 
largely depends on the chances, how peace can be established in the 
region.  
In the Eastern European region, the creation of national states took 
place in two main waves. They were born after the First World War, as a 
result of the collapse of the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, and then 
after 1990 by the disintegration of two Socialist federations (the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia). The Second World War did not create new national 
states in the region; it rather changed their status, affiliation (Baltics, the 
division of Germany) and the territory of some of the countries (Germany, 
Poland or Soviet Union). 
Consequently, in the last decades, all the major ethnicities of Central 
Europe, Baltic and the Balkan countries acquired national statehood. 
(Except the Roma who, however, do not have such an ambition.) 
Accordingly, now there are 28 nation states in the region.  
If we look beyond Europe, it is clear, that the process of national state 
building is much more contradictory. In many cases, the process of national 
integration is far from complete, and there are large differences in the 
stability of the national state frameworks. 
In the last half century, we can experience a remarkable political and 
economic development of a great number of countries. Among them, we 
can mention the “Asian Tigers”, which not only produced impressive rapid 
growth, but achieved remarkable successes in several sectors in the global 
markets. The number of “emerging” (among them Central and Eastern 




of them. The acronyms, like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) or “Gold Coast 
economies” (Mexico, Peru, Chile and Columbia) are well known from the 
daily newspaper headlines.        
Based on their rapid (often two-digit) growth rates, these countries 
have succeeded in improving their global ranking in per capita GDP and 
other parameters of development (among others in indebtedness or in 
competitiveness). They have achieved substantial structural change, and 
have proved to be able to create sectors or companies, which successfully 
compete in the global market. We can observe in these countries the 
development of infrastructure and the level of education, the creation of 
welfare systems and the establishment of democratic political institutions 
and structures. All of these can be considered remarkable, even if we can 
experience big differences in performance among these countries and in 
different periods. 
The question remains how far these quantitative developments are 
enough for global convergence of these nations or the difficult qualitative 
changes cannot be avoided. “The super-long view inspires some of the 
most influential forecasts of our time, which look back to the overwhelming 
economic might of China and India in the seventeenth century as evidence 
that they will re-emerge as dominant global powers in 2030 or 2050. In 
1600 China accounted for more than one-fourth of global GDP, and India 
accounted for just under a fourth. Though their shares have fallen 
dramatically since then, the super-long view skips past the messy recent 
centuries. The reasoning seems to be that seventeenth-century 
performance offer some guarantee of future results. Sweeping extrapolation 
has become a staple argument for many companies, politicians, and high-
profile public intellectuals who believe we are entering a Pacific Century or 
even an African Century”22. He adds immediately his doubts. “As much as 
we all love the speculative titillation of futurology, no one can forecast the 
next century with any credibility and more important, to held accountable to 
it.”23  
The development of emerging nations is still dependent on technology 
and innovation capacities, resources and markets of the developed parts of 
the global economy. The gaps are even greater if we look at levels of social 
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and political developments. The US and Europe can easily lose it leads in 
production potentials. Their technological and innovation capacities are 
another question. One can ask, could it be a country leading world power 
without democratic social and political structure and culture, like China? Or 
should it remain only a “super power” as the Soviet Union was? It is another 
question, how far the US and Europe make enough to preserve their 
present global positions? The EU has all the economic, financial, 
intellectual capacities to be a real global actor. What is missing? It is the 
political will and strategy, and the necessary political cooperation capacity 
among the present members. 
Many scholars speak about an “African Century”, but at least in the 
foreseeable future, its prospects remain contradictory. Africa still sticks to 
underdevelopment, external dependence and indebtedness, and lacks of 
resources for accelerating their economic development. Africa rather faces 
the challenges of environmental degradation, the excessive growth of its 
population (producing millions of potential migrants) and dis-integration of 
the even existing national states. The question applies to the region as well. 
It is not easy to tell proper forecast about the future. 
 
Principles of nation building 
At the moment, the about 200 national states in the world are organized 
along very different principles. Their development, character and 
performance are based on several factors, primarily on political, economic, 
geographical, historical, cultural, or many others. Among them the territorial, 
the ethnic and the political factors have particular importance. The different 
concepts of nation are primarily attached to these considerations. 
“According to the present terminology and interpretation, the nation is a 
historically evolved permanent human community, which is connected and 
distinguished with different characteristics from other communities.” It has 
two basic types: “One is definitely characterised by belonging to a common 
territory, and same legal-political and economic frameworks, namely to a 
state, while the other by sameness of language and culture, the myth or 
reality of common origin.”24 In the first case, we can speak about political or 
state nation, in the other about culture nation.  
The concept of “political or civil nation” was formulated in the second 
                                                          




half of the 18th century, in the ideological discussions of Enlightenment, 
preceding the French revolution. It is about the creation of nation states 
based on democratic principles. It recognises that the nation means one 
territory and one state, and it is created by the common will of its citizens. 
That was a radical break with monarchic concepts of the medieval states, 
which were represented by the king and its power was based on the grace 
of the God. The modern nation state was conceived as a political 
community, guided by the interests and the will of its citizens, rendering 
them with freedom, security, equality and broad democratic rights. The 
political nation is accepted principle of French Constitution and political 
system of many countries. 
The acquisition of territories was an important part of national state 
forming, both in strict economic terms and from the point of view of state 
sovereignty (marking of borders and rights of taxation). “Westphalian 
sovereignty held that each state would exercise supreme, comprehensive, 
unqualified and exclusive rule over its territorial jurisdiction.”25The territory 
for industrial societies was important, both as a resource and as a market. 
Till the 1960s, in most of the countries, the mining and the agriculture 
remained important sectors of the economy. The rule of the territories was a 
basic political issue; in fact, it was the major manifestation and symbol of 
political power and sovereignty. The territory can be emotionally important 
for the individuals, as a homeland or “motherland”. This concept of nation 
state is defined, as based primarily on territorial principles, while it 
recognises the regional pluralities, and accepting the ethnic differences. 
The dominant trend of national integration was to create a culturally 
and ethnically homogenous nation state. The concept of ethnical nation 
stresses such community forming factors as a common origin, common 
cultural and language heritage, certain common attachment to a dominant 
religion, or common historical and political fate. The cultural or (language) 
nation means peoples speaking a common language, with individuals with a 
common cultural background, but regardless of which state’s territory they 
live. 
The medieval state forms were based on dynastic rulers, usually 
stressing their divine authorization. In spite these states were named along 
any ethnicity (French, Hungarian, Russian, etc.), the ethnic identification 
                                                          




played only fairly limited role.  In fact, on the contrary, along imperial 
thinking, the preference of multi-ethnicity was rather stressed.  As the power 
and greatness of a king was based on how many people or territories could 
he rule, identification and connection to one specific people would have 
been considered as a limitation. That was well represented already in the 
policies of Hungarian King Stephen I. right from the beginning. He tells in 
his “admonitions” (“Sixth”) to his son: “on the basis of royal honour, the 
guests and newcomers deserve this place, because already the Roman 
Empire had become powerful through the arrival of many wise and noble 
men from foreign countries. Also today, these hospites make the kings 
great, because they bring many kind of habits, language and weapons – so 
much as a country with only ‘single’ language and habits is weak and 
fragile.”26 
The idea of homogenous nation state is largely an attempt to bring the 
dominant ethnic groups into monopolistic position. These try to subordinate 
the others, like the territories. The policies towards minorities living in a 
nation state have ranged from assimilation or expulsion, or even to 
extermination. The assimilation, as a main form can be declared (“melting 
pot”), can be spontaneous (“natural”), which was the dominant way, and 
can be enforced. Later can be connected with ethnic cleansing or religious 
persecutions as the extermination of aborigines (Indians or Maoris) or 
series of ethnic genocides, even if these states otherwise claim to be 
“democratic” ones. It was the source of oppressive national policies that the 
dominant ethnicity tried to enforce its religion as a state religion. It often 
leads to international conflicts, when a given nation state tries to acquire or 
“protect” its ethnic minorities living in neighbouring countries. 
Others oppose the ethnic homogeneity, and see multi-ethnicity as a 
source of strength and development. They stress the unified state 
frameworks and the territorial integrity, as basic attributes of a nation. The 
same characterize the imperial nation concepts. 
As indicated by the UN University data: “on our planet about 5000 
ethnic groups exist, who according to UN Charter can claim national self-
determination. From them about 400 would be able to create an 
independent state, and about 80 are actively fighting for that aim.”27 Taking 
into account, that on the one hand, in the about 200 independent states, the 
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boundaries of ethnic integration far not coincide with that of national states, 
while on the other,  one can hardly speak about ethnically homogenous 
nations. In fact, at present, all of the traditional “nation states” have a 
smaller or a larger number of ethnic minorities within their borders, while 
most of the ethnicities live inside borders of several different national states. 
As the data indicate, there are several ethnicities, which own the 
capacities for independent national statehood, but they have only limited 
chances for that or not even aspire for that. The capabilities for self-
determination far not cover the prerequisites of building national states or 
that national integration. The difference between the national (ethnic) 
integration and the national state building is one of the major source of 
conflicts and contradictions of the international systems of the modern 
history. 
The multinational state is reality, and there is no basis to question its 
viability and potentials. In Western Europe, within the framework of the 
broader democratisation of the last decades, there has been an extension 
of minority and nationality rights, and in many regions, the changes in local 
autonomies and self-determination have often been exemplary. After many 
years of bloody conflicts, para-military organizations fighting for partition 
such as an IRA or ETA have been disbanded.  
„At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the population of East-
Central and South-Eastern Europe was composed of 24 larger and more 
than dozen smaller ethnic groups. Most of them were Slavs.” They „were 
subjects of three big multi-ethnic political units, the Ottoman, the Habsburg 
and the Russian Empires. All the three empires showed considerable 
insensibility towards national principle; their main cohesive force was the 
dynastic loyalty and the religion.”28  
In Eastern part of the continent, the developments after 1990 prove 
that „in the nation states the number and the scale of minorities did not 
decrease, but rather increased. It was also verified that in this region the 
homogenous nation states in spite the large political fragmentation can be 
created only with difficulty or not at all.”29 Although, it is controversial, “at the 
moment, only six states can be considered as homogenous nation states, 
where the share of minorities does not reach 10%. Although in many cases, 
these shares of minorities are disputed, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Armenia 
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and Czechia are such homogenous nation states.” 30  These”10%”-s, 
however, both theoretically, and factually (due to statistical manipulations 
and distortions) are broadly questioned. Their composition has also 
drastically changed. At the beginning of 1990s, the largest minority in the 
region were Hungarians (3 millions), but by now the Russian took over this 
position (by15-16 millions).  
In the region, in spite of redrawing borders and broad 
democratization, the minority problems still prevail. Except some ethnic civil 
wars (Yugoslavia and former SU), open conflicts were mostly handled, but 
the restriction of minority rights and the rejection of otherwise legitimate 
claims for local or cultural autonomies have remained acute problems and 
potential causes for both internal and external disputes. Obsolete 
nationalistic mentalities do revive from time to time, and in the region, we 
are still far away from European value-conform solutions of the 21st century.  
„All these mean that the minority issue, namely the disharmonic system of 
relation of nation, nationality and state – partly in similar, partly in changing 
forms – remained one of the basic problems of East-central and South-
eastern Europe.”31  
Addressing and settling the disputes of ethnic autonomy and minority 
rights, therefore, has always been important factors of stability in national 
integration. In this respect, the countries have differed in their performance, 
and this is the case until recently. In the process of democratisation of the 
last decades, it was often argued that besides securing the general 
democratic frameworks, there is no need for minority rights. This is, 
however, unacceptable, and rather brought tensions onto the surface. In 
fact, the shortcomings of minority rights appear now, as one of the most 
serious democratic deficits of nation states all over the world, but also in the 
European Union. 
One of the special dimensions of the integration and the minority 
issue is the diaspora. Historically, according to the Bible, diaspora meant 
dispersion and forced movement of Jews from Israel or later those Jews 
who live outside Israel (Babylon, Egypt or Roman Empire). In general, it is 
scattering of peoples from their home country to other places. Diaspora can 
be defined as “a group of people who spread from one original country to 
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other countries, or the act of spreading in this way.”32  In New York, the 
largest are Jamaican, Caribbean, Indian, Jewish, Ukrainian, Irish, 
Armenian, Greek, Chinese, or Korean diaspora. From the end of 19th 
century, there was a numerous Hungarian diaspora in the city of Cleveland, 
but it melted away due to assimilation. There are two main types of 
diaspora: ethnic and religious ones. 
 While large parts of minorities are characterized by dispersion even 
inside different countries, contrary to its original meaning, several diaspora 
are organized into certain integrative frameworks. They are based on close 
and intensive business connections, characterized by high level of cohesion 
and strong identification with their own community. Even the territorial 
dimensions of integration can be captured. In many cases, the diaspora 
lives in certain districts, usually in large cities, and legally owning large parts 
of the grounds of that district. Diaspora can control certain sectors or trade 
of the region, and in some cases with substantial influence in the given 
fields. Their legal position can be differing in the various countries, but in 
many developed countries they just have to comply with the local 
legislation.  
Diaspora can have broad influences, and what is important it can 
largely enhance the international position and influence of its home country. 
Israel and Armenia, by size, are small countries, but through their large 
diaspora they can exert strong influences for asserting their national 
interests in several international dimensions. In certain ethnic, religious or 
political questions the diaspora is often more chauvinist than its home 
country. 
 
      Evolution of national integration and nation building 
In general terms, national integration is a community building, which is 
much broader than creation of national states. “According to the present 
terminology and interpretation, the nation is a historically evolved 
permanent human community, which is connected and distinguished with 
                                                          





different characteristics from other communities.”33The process assumes all 
the dimension and prerequisites of integration processes, and the state 
framework are only one of them.  
Historically, national integrations have emerged in the last two - three 
hundred years. Structurally, they have been related to the industrial 
revolution; in social-political terms they could be connected to capitalist 
transformation. In the birth of the concept of modern nations, however, 
several factors played a role. Culturally and ideologically already from the 
16th and 17th centuries, the Renaissance and the Reformation should be 
mentioned. Approximately, from the middle of the 18th century, the ideas of 
Enlightenment played crucial role in shaping the emerging nations.  
In economic terms, national integration was based on the 
intensification of local economic cooperation, generated by the industrial 
revolution. Industrialization busted trade, and led to the creation of national 
markets and monies. Gyula Kautz, wrote in 1860: “at the beginning of the 
modern times”, we could experience “the complete transformation of the 
economic life of mankind, and in the economic life of peoples with the 
fundamental changes and movements of the intellectual, religious, state 
and social culture, new forms and grounds were created.” As result of 
these, “the division among the economic sectors, the employment of credit 
facilities, measures of supporting the transport, keeping contacts, postal 
connections, public roads and shipping got increasing importance, the 
commodity transport and the traffic became more rapid and more complex.” 
“The medieval natural economy was replaced by money economy of 
modern times.”34 “The introduction and consolidation of money economy (at 
least partially) could be attributed to the fact, the division of labour reached 
such a high level, the capital grew to such an extent, such an industrial and 
trade prosperity appeared, which formerly never was even guessed, such a 
wealth of nations was created, which during the millennia of history was 
never known.” 35  The economic stagnation of the previous ages of the 
human history was replaced by economic growth. 
Based on national markets, the national states took broad regulatory 
functions (modern taxing or customs duties), the main institutions of policies 
(treasuries or national banks) have been created. The regulatory roles of 
the national states showed long evolution from free competition capitalism 
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to the emergence of the recent models of regulated market capitalism.  
The emergence of bourgeois, mass societies was an important and 
decisive development. „Farer a people was from the bourgeois form of life, 
only more slowly and with difficulty was able to realize the Enlightenment 
and the concept of nation in its heart: mountain herdsmen, serfs or poor 
village people are not proper medium for national self-consciousness.”36  
The medieval states were characterized by a low level and efficiency 
of state administration. Their role was rather tax collection, instead of 
governing, the given countries or regions were rather only ruled. The nation 
states gave rise of efficient state bureaucracies that could govern large 
groups of people impersonally, and efficiently impose and apply the law 
through the bureaucratic state machinery. Frederick the Great of Prussia is 
widely considered as the founder of modern state bureaucracy.  
In general, in nation forming, communication played a special role, 
and from “technical” point of view, the invention of printing (Guttenberg) was 
a turning point. The process was accelerated by the national media – 
national journalism and the educational systems. The typical stages of this 
process were: “1. creation of new literary language, and its codification with 
help of vocabularies, grammars and different literary works. 2. evocation 
and propagation of the ‘glorious past’ with help of historiography, 
ethnography and different arts  and finally 3. establishment of such 
institutions (academies, museums, associations, theatres) and networks of 
schools, which took care with predestination and great efficiency about the 
wide ranging dissemination of the above created intellectual connective 
materials”37 The extension of the use of literary or official languages was 
particularly important. According to historical data, at the time of the French 
revolution at the end of 18th century, only about half of French spoke French 
language, and this number was much lower in Italy before unification. 
The birth of nations coincided with the birth of science of national 
economy (in fact, with emergence of economic sciences). It was marked by 
such big thinkers of 18th century as Fernando Galiani, Antonio Genovesi, 
Cesare Beccaria, Francois Quesnay, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, David 
Hume, Josiah Tucker, James Stuart or Adam Smith. „The necessary 
precondition of such science as national economy is the long line of 
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economic development and conditions.” Therefore, „in reality the science of 
national economy we can examine only in industrially and economically 
highly developed modern times.”38 It was “a rich era in movements, which 
coincides with American and French state transformation, the extension of 
the industrial and social and cultural interests, the emergence of the notion 
of the world and with first vibration of those immense humane and freedom 
ideas and aspirations, which in reality gave the first great push through 
which the genial British Adam Smith could come to foundations of the 
magnificent philosophical system of economy, employment and trade.”39   
With the emergence of capitalist societies, national integrations have 
taken an increasingly organic character. Contrary to former oppressive 
societies, such as slavery or medieval serfdom, labour and capital relations 
were marketized, and in general, socio-economic relations were organised 
by the market and democratic principles. Due to class and ethnic conflicts, 
the element of enforcement in national integrations, however, remained 
strong from the beginning. 
Besides the internal factors, the external threats, the varying degrees 
of national conflicts assumed repressive state structures. The character and 
extension of these structures depended on several internal (state of 
democracy) and external (security threats) factors, but they remained 
strong until recently. 
 
Diverging ways of national integration – Case of Eastern Europe 
The processes of national integration and emergence of national 
states were differentiated not only regionally, but also in time and in 
character. As far as the Eastern part of the European continent is 
concerned, due to their different and socio-economic developments and 
structures, the development of nations took different route. Two factors 
played determining role: 1. The belated industrialization and modernization; 
and 2. The dependent and semi-colonial status of most of the countries of 
the region. 
The belated industrialization and capitalist development of the region 
was analysed by several Hungarian historians (Pach Zs. Pál, Berend T. 
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Iván, Ránki György, Pető Iván etc.). Long list could be quoted from the 
other countries of the region, as well. The region was characterised by 
substantial difference in development. “The Austrian and Czech territories 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, although belatedly, but followed the direction of 
Western European development, which by the end of 19th century in terms 
of expansion of large-scale industries brought radical transformation of 
economic structure. In the Eastern territories of the Monarchy, inside them, 
in Hungary, in the Polish territories belonging to different empires and in the 
Russian Empire, the economic development showed differing 
characteristics. Besides the large delay, at the turn of 19th and 20th 
centuries, the economies of these countries was characterised by a special 
industrial revolution, based largely on foreign direct investments, and in 
spite of development of infrastructure, and emerging the agrarian-industrial 
structure of economy, the birth of Western type of modern industrial 
countries remained unaccomplished. On the Balkan even the Russian – 
Polish – Hungarian type of special industrial revolution failed. The Balkan 
was not able to move out of its traditional agrarian backwardness.”40  
The increasing constraints for transformation and modernization 
calling for integration from the second half of 19th century found the region 
in imperial framework. Consequently, the process of integration started in 
these imperial structures. This „imperial integration” in the second half of 
19th century“ in general, “embraced countries of very different character and 
development into one artificial unit, and these imperial frameworks from the 
70-80s years, with policies of protective tariffs, emerging industrial markets 
and trade in itself led to formation of a special economic integration”.41 “All 
this meant that the modern economic development as a matter of course, at 
the largest territories of Central and Eastern Europe started not in national 
frameworks, but in special, large imperial units, namely as non-modern 20th 
century type of economic integration.”42 After the First World War, these 
“imperial units” disintegrated, for decades followed an inward looking nation 
building, but the new nation states inherited many of the properties 
(institutional, infrastructural, cultural or social) necessary for modern 
integrated nations. 
Hungary, in many respects, was among relatively favourable 
circumstances. “In Central Europe, virtually only the Hungarians were in 
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such position: that by the end of century (18th.), they were able to produce 
their own unified nationalism, as they started the fight for pushing aside the 
resistance of Viennese government towards full and immediate interaction 
between the state and the language. As it is known, by the 40s years of 
19th century, they succeeded.”43 The Hungarian became “official language” 
in 1844, replacing primarily the Latin. In spite of limited political, legal 
independence, which many respects remained even after 1867, rapid 
cultural (language reform and development of a national literature and other 
arts), social and economic nation building (industrialization and 
development of national capitalistic relations) started and progressed. 
According to András Gerő, the 1848/49 „revolution” from points of 
view of social development and nation building was an “emancipation 
breakthrough”. „In our history, 1848/49 was Hungarian bourgeois state 
founding. The content of founding of the state was emancipation in several 
dimensions. In Hungary, in 1848-49, in about one and half year every such 
happened, which then and there, in this respect could happen, a real 
breakthrough happened.”44 The most of the other nationalities were in a 
less favourable situation, but many of them (Poles or Romanian), rather 
with some delay, showed similar developments. 
Consequently, in spite that they achieved statehood only after 1918 or 
1990, the emergence of such nations as Croatia or Estonia does not date 
from 1990, but much earlier than that. In different type of imperial 
framework, these ethnicities acquired their own national identity and 
cohesion and could develop the economic bases and those human, cultural 
or political infrastructures, which are the necessary prerequisites of a nation 
state.  
Similar development characterised many other nations. The “imperial 
integration” frameworks, in spite that they represented an enforced and 
inorganic integration; as it was proved by other colonies or dependent 
countries all over the world; they practically were rather fermenting the 
national integration processes. „The concept of modern nation-state, the 
national ideas, and with them the strong nationalism took roots in all 
countries parallel with the colonialization and with the presence of 
Europeans. The peoples of Southeast Asia, as the other subordinated 
peoples of the world kept natural to follow the example of Western Europe, 
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and in this feeling and will they were convinced by the exceptionally rapid 
and efficient modernization of Japan producing the only Asian success story 
of that time. Their conclusion was unambiguous: the progressing ahead, 
having worthy human life, achieving and up holding sovereignty can be only 
secured through creation of independent nation state. In addition, it became 
clear, that in the 19th and 20th centuries, the modernization and democracy 
is inseparably connected to nation state. All these set new requirements to 
social reformers: creation of new national structures, common language, 
and national homogenization in a unified and centralized state.”45 
Besides all of its negative impacts, colonialization contributed to 
building and linking up local and national markets, the creation of local 
national bourgeoisie and the resistance against colonialization generated 
internal cohesion of the societies, all over the world. As a result, the new 
nation states inherited many of the properties (institutional, infrastructural, 
cultural or social) necessary for modern integrated nations. This pattern of 
development was characteristic all over the world, particularly in de-
colonialization processes following the Second World War. 
One important point in comparison between Western and Eastern 
Europe should be particularly stressed. The Western nations were born in 
fight for freedom and democracy, and that created strong democratic 
foundations for their national integration. In Eastern Europe, the nations 
were to a large extent created in the fire of their fight for national 
independence. The freedom and independence meant different emphasises 
of national integration, and the democratic principles got less attention. Of 
course, this is a rough generalization, and the historical traditions and 
several other factors could play a role (Finland, Ireland or Italy). This 
historical heritage still to date has its impacts on the concepts and 
aspirations of the different members of European Union. 
 
Mixed integration performance of national states 
There are several established and highly integrated nations, but it 
would be not easy to define and select a perfectly integrated nation, a 
perfect model of a real nation or nation state. With high probability, we 
hardly can find such an existing model, particularly in light a changing 
conditions and challenges which nations face and with which they have to 
                                                          




comply from time to time.  
At the same time, there are “nation states”, which so far have 
achieved only limited levels of national integration, neither in terms of a real 
national economy and regulatory structures, nor in cultural, social or 
political cohesion of their societies. In these respects, we can speak about 
partial, defected, deformed or failed integration.  
The failure of national integration can be explained by many reasons. 
It was an unfortunate development that after World War II several artificial 
nation states were created by arbitrary borders drawn by the former colonial 
powers. This arbitrary division led to the separation of ethnic groups, which 
then culminated in ethnic and tribal conflicts. In organic national integration 
processes, these local communities or tribal differences simply blend 
together, and can be tamed into folkloristic or tourist curiosities. In enforced 
national integration systems, however, such arbitrary divisions lead to 
bloody tribal wars, which was the case in Africa and in the Middle East. The 
main cases of the defective or deformed nations are those based on 
enforced integration. 
According to the literature, the artificial or “failed” nations mean 
countries, with the loss of control on their territory, weakening of their 
legitimate authority, their failure to provide public services or acting in 
international relations. To draw a line between them would be difficult, 
particularly as there are large numbers of states with contradictory status. 
All these indicate that the national integration is not only an unfinished 
process, but it is burdened with a broad range of deficiencies and deficits, 
and they cope with them with varying successes. These deficiencies or 
deficits can be attached to any elements of socio-economic structure or 
formation, and even the stable nations are not exempt from them.  
From points of view of stability and development prospects of a 
nation, the state of cohesion is crucial. The cohesion can be undermined by 
ethnic, social or class conflicts, which can be the main factors of its longer 
stability or instability. Policy mistakes can greatly contribute to them. Again, 
we can find great differences in political performance of different nations, 
and they change from time to time. The most dramatic forms of political 
failures are armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars or rule of armed gangs. The 
recent crisis had broad impacts on cohesion, in fact, we face a cohesion 




The deficits and failures can be structural. One extreme case can be 
a small, less developed country with mono-cultural production and export 
structures. In its case, we can hardly speak about any social or economic 
sovereignty, and its economic development and welfare is beyond of its 
own national control. But in the present age of international integration, 
even the larger developed and diversified economies and societies are 
exposed to external factors. They have a large scope of control over these 
processes, but as the recent economic crisis proved; even the largest and 
the strongest can fail in coping with them. 
The regulatory deficiencies are equally important, and less dependent 
on the levels of development and potentials. These can originate from 
defects of the general socio-economic model (constructional ones) or just 
for policy mistakes (operational defects). Corruption is a very general form. 
In times of international integration, the success or failure of harmonization 
of external and internal national integration policies has a critical role 
If we look at the global map of national integrations, we find a fairly 
mixed, in many respects discouraging and even disappointing picture. 
National integration with the creation of new nation states remained part of 
the global integration process, and for many the crises indicate uncertain 
future. 
To draw an exact map about the state of national integration would be 
an almost impossible venture. Such measurement depends on the 
theoretical approaches, the chosen parameters, the methods of calculations 
and many other uncertain factors. So when we quote the “Fragility Index of 
States” for illustration, we offer it with serious reservations. 
“Fragility Index of States” of 2018 makes a ranking among 167 
nations. 46  It puts countries into ten main categories: very sustainable, 
sustainable, very stable, more stable, stable, warning, high warning, alert, 
high alert and very high alert.  
In very sustainable category, we find, such countries as Finland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Denmark, and in the sustainable category Iceland, 
Ireland, Australia, Sweden, New Zeeland, Canada, Germany, Austria, 
Netherland, Portugal and Belgium. In the very stable group there are 11, in 
the more stable 17 and in the stable 12 countries. All together in the 
sustainable and the stable group count 56 countries, from the 28 EU 
                                                          




members, except Cyprus, all fall into these categories. Hungary, leading the 
stable group, is the 45th among these countries. These groups take just 1/3 
of the whole. 
There are 79 countries in the warning (45%) and 32 in the alert group 
(less than 20%).  Among the first 13 “most fragile” (very high alert) we find 
South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and (in the high alert): Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, 
Zimbabwe, Iraq, Haiti and Guinea.  
It seems that only about 1/3 of the present nation states can be 
considered as relatively established and integrated nations, while about 1/5 
belong to “failed” or unstable nations.  
This situation is one of the main destabilizing factors of global order 
and integration. At present, the intra- or interstate national conflicts are 
contributing factors to the destabilization of the global community, in some 
respects, threatening even the cohesion of the European Union. 
 
Nation and nationalism - nation tainted  
Nationalism is a complex notion, which is defined as an ideological, 
political or economic program, a movement, a system of values, expression 
of individual loyalty and devotion to a national state and community. As a 
movement, it is dating back to the end of 18th century, and since that it is 
generally recognized as one of the dominant sentiments pervading the 
private and public life of the society. In Europe or America, it dominated the 
history from the 19th, while it spread to Asia and Africa mainly in the 20th 
century. It means attachment to the native soil, to common ethnicity, to 
historical traditions or to a glorified past. It claims that each nationality 
should form a state, and that state should include all the members of the 
nationality. The former loyalties to a city state, to a feudal lord, to a dynastic 
state or a religion are largely replaced by attachment to a national 
community or state. It means identification with such shared social 
characteristics as culture, language, religion, politics, tradition and belief in 
a common history and to promote national unity or solidarity. In the modern 
history, state and civilization became identified with the nation. 




particular nation. It aims at gaining and maintaining sovereignty, self-
determination, maintaining control over territory and state. Nationalism is 
often connected with very strong expression of related emotions; it 
demands sacrifices to the nation as a community. One can distinguish 
among ethnic, economic, political, religious, territorial, racial or even sport 
nationalism. It is widely held, that one of the main functions of nation state 
is defense against external threats, while providing important services for its 
citizens.  
The twentieth century globalization is growingly accompanied with 
profound distrust towards nationalism.  Nationalism is considered by many 
as main source of war, and history seems to support this with large number 
of examples. The assumption of peace through war is considered false, 
even if the threat of nuclear war, recently, proved to be a relevant deterrent. 
The representatives of the most extreme examples of nationalism are 
the fascist (“nazi-type”) states. They are prioritizing ethnicity and among 
others, conceptually they are based on “race theory”, which distinguishes 
between the superior and inferior races.  
We know, there is only one human race, there are no such “races” as 
Hungarians and Germans, or “Whites”, “Blacks” and “Yellows”. The 
superiority often is supported with mystification in the past, assuming as if 
glorious past would give any particular legitimatization. These arbitrary 
distinctions generally are accompanied by political exclusion or 
discriminatory policies, and often with ethnic cleansing or genocide. In term 
of later one, the holocaust committed by German National-Socialists or by 
their followers and allies, was the most shocking example. The list of 
genocides just in the last one hundred years, would be quite long. Such 
developments mean that national states are criminalized, and in spite of 
loud nationalistic rhetoric, they have disastrous consequences for the given 
nation. 
Nazism proved to be a dangerous illness, and aberration leading to 
self-destruction. „The nation should not be understood in terms of the 
French nation at the Revolution or the German nation in its twentieth-
century frenzy. For those were nations gone mad, in which the springs of 
civil peace had been poisoned and the social organism colonised by anger, 
resentment and fear. All Europe was threatened by the German nation, but 




nationalist fever.”47    
The Nazis have raped, high jacked and compromised “nation”. 
“Nationalism”, through them, got pejorative connotation, and in political 
discussions, and in public thinking it became fixed as a negative concept 
and project. The concept of the nation has been tainted and any disinfection 
seems complicated.  
„In the following, we would like to refrain from any kind of evaluating 
remarks and to present nationalism as an intellectual-political trend, existing 
in real politics, which sees the national state and the nation as a central  
value and to which the individuals owe high loyalty. This is not good or bad, 
but it is an expression of the natural, human demand, which on the basis of 
common history, language and culture, feels identity with a given group, 
with own people. The nationalism, of course, can appear in different forms. 
It is appropriate to make the difference between patriotism and chauvinism. 
The tolerant ‘patriotism’, respecting the otherness of minorities is a positive 
phenomenon. It meets the natural need for belonging to a group, as it 
exerts substantial integrative impacts on the society and it puts national 
identity into the narrower or a wider framework of identities, which extend 
from the family or profession through the homeland to Europe, to Western 
civilization, and perhaps even to the universal human community. Beyond 
that, in Eastern Europe, patriotism can play another very important role as it 
can free energies, useful for prosperity of the peoples, which are so much 
needed to overcome the huge difficulties in transition to legal state 
democracy and social market economy. Contrary to that, intolerant 
‘chauvinism’, hostile to minorities and despising human value, is a negative 
phenomenon. It contests the need for national identity from other peoples, 
while requiring passionately, actually often violently for themselves. In 
addition, in Eastern Europe, the chauvinism is often hostile even towards 
modernization, and it opposes the necessary economic and political 
reforms.”48  
Many argue that patriotism “is the loyalty of citizens, and the 
foundation of ’republican’ government; nationalism is a shared hostility to 
the strangers, the intruder, the persons who belongs ’outside’. I feel some 
sympathy for that approach. Properly understood, however, the republican 
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patriotism defended by Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Mill is a form of 
national loyalty: not a pathological form like nationalism, but a natural love a 
country, countrymen and the culture that united them. Patriots are attached 
to the people and the territory that are their by right; and patriotism involves 
and attempt to transcribe that right into impartial government and a rule of 
law. This underlying territorial right is implied in the very word – the patria 
being the ’fatherland’, the place where you and I belong. Territorial loyalty, I 
suggest, is at the root of all forms of government where the law and liberty 
reign supreme.”49 
On November 11, 2018, a number of world leaders came together in 
commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the end of First World War in 
Paris. There were bilateral meetings, among other between Emanuel 
Macron and Donald Trump, and as it could be expected the usual exchange 
of blows between the two leaders were again repeated. On the same day, 
Macron wrote on his Tweeter: “Patriotism is the exact opposite of 
nationalism. Nationalism is a betrayal of patriotism. By putting our own 
interests first, with no regard for others, we erase the very thing that a 
nation holds dearest, and the thing that keeps it alive: its moral values.” 
Not surprisingly thousands of notes were provoked. But it is clear that 
a distinction should be made between the declaration of the hegemonic 
type of nationalism, and the expression and assertion of priority of national 
interests by legitimate national politicians in democratic partnership 
relations through coordination and compromises. Angela Merkel told in the 
Bundestag on November 21 2018: “it is not patriotism, but the most pure 
form of nationalism, if somebody believes that can solve everything alone, 
and must not care about others, but the patriotism is when besides German 
interests we take into account other interests as well.” (Index, 2018.11.22.) 
Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of EU Commission speaks in the same 
spirit, adding his views on future of a United States of Europe. “The 
enthusiasts of stupid nationalism will have a price to pay for this. I respect 
nations. I’m not a Euro-federalist and I don’t believe in a United States of 
Europe, a copycat U.S. European citizens don’t want a construction like 
that, a melting pot where their character and feelings are no longer 
recognizable. You can’t build a European Union against the will of nations, 
but you can build it against stupid nationalism. What we need is sound 
                                                          




patriotism. And that we have.” 50 
No doubt, one possibility is to find relevant synonyms of the notion. In 
fact, the discussions about nationalism contra patriotism go back to the 
second half of 19th century, raised by the labour movement in context of 
relation between nationalism and class struggle. Later, in Eastern Europe, 
“patriotism” was a broadly used term of Bolshevik propaganda, and was a 
certain parallel notion to “proletarian internationalism” or “fraternity”, as 
rejection of any national feelings (“bourgeois nationalism”). In Hungary, for 
decades, people could vote on elections on the candidates of the Patriotic 
Peoples Front, in this respect the cover organisation of the Communist one 
party system. Not surprisingly, in the public opinion in the region, from the 
beginning, “patriotism” was taken with suspicion and reservation. As the 
political struggles showed in the region, after 1990 it did not prove attractive 
and it hardly had equal mobilization force and sympathy as the term of 
nationalism. Recently, some of the ultra-nationalists claim themselves as 
real “patriots” (Heinz-Christian Strache). In fact, we can say there is a 
danger that the elevated notion of patriotism gets also tainted.  
One can sympathize with the proposals on ”patriotism” contra 
“chauvinism” or irredentism.   
Chauvinism is „the extreme form of nationalism, which with extreme 
prejudice proclaims its own superiority against other nations. It is 
characterized with emotional politicisation, ideologized declaration of 
national superiority, overemphasis on national interests, and sometime stirs 
hatred against other nations with anti-minority incitation and harassment.”51 
According Cambridge Dictionary it is “the strong and unreasonable belief 
that your own country or race is the best or most important.”. Chauvinism as 
a notion is a narrower concept than nationalism, but as a policy it is more 
exclusive, radical or intolerant. 
While the Nazism is based on ethnic or racial prejudice, the 
Bolshevism is characterised by class chauvinism. “However, if the nation is 
divided into classes, the national interests cannot be above classes, 
independent of them.” 52  These chauvinisms are highly divisive and 
undermine the cohesion and integration of a community or a nation. 
                                                          
50 There will be a price to pay for stupid nationalism” Interview with Jean-Claude Juncker. HVG. May 2, 
2019.  p. 7. 
51 Magyar Nagylexikon, (2003): p. 192 




According to these views, the real representatives or guardians of the 
nations are certain groups or classes of the society (white Arians or just the 
working class), while the others, in the best case are only secondary 
citizens (even if there are no formal legal discrimination against them), or 
they can be stigmatized as enemies of the nation (Jews or Kulaks). 
The other types of chauvinisms (religious, political or cultural) are 
equally harmful and divisible. The declaration of the “Christian” or “Islamic” 
nation can only be a value statement, but even in case of lack of any 
political or legal discrimination, it may create division or emotional and 
psychological harassment in the other group. The political chauvinism can 
mean demonization or criminalisation of parties (opposition), political or 
ideological trends (“Neo-liberalism”) or persons (Gülen). The stable and 
integrated nations should be democratic, recognizing the multi-colourity, as 
a source of development and prosperity. 
The other possibility for distinction is adding different of adjectives, 
like “good” or bad”; “positive” or “negative”; “inclusive” or “exclusive”.   
“The positive form of nationalism is tied to self-confidence and openness 
and the concept of the public goods. Negative nationalism is dependent on 
fear and anger and a desperate conviction that one nation’s rights exists by 
comparison with those of another nations, as if in competition that produces 
winners or losers.” 53  According to the prominent historian: “I would be 
careful about both extremes: on the one hand we should avoid this extreme 
nationalistic thinking, that my nation is the only important thing in the world 
and everything and anything can and should be sacrificed for the nation. 
This is the road leading to fascism, to war, to genocide. But we should also 
avoid the other extreme, of thinking that nationalism is bad and evil, and 
that anybody who loves his country or raise a flag is a fascist. No. Briefly I 
would say that nationalism is not about hating foreigners. It's about loving 
your compatriots. That evil side of nationalism has to do with hating 
foreigners. But the good side of nationalism is about taking care of it, like 
paying your taxes honestly and having a good health care system, a non-
corrupt health care system. This is the good side of nationalism.” 54 
 
The use of “inclusive” and “exclusive” adjectives also helps distinction. 
“The gradual divergence between an inclusive nationalism, which assumed 
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some compatibility with the existence of multiple identities, and an exclusive 
nationalism, which promoted egoism, assimilation policies and a mono-
ethnic predominance, marked the construction of identities in Europe as 
whole. However, in some areas, the process was particularly painful when 
boundaries between identities were vague, undetermined and debatable.”55 
The dilemma seems to remain about the perceptions of nationalism, 
and due to its revival it feels not easy to overcome the more or less fixed 
and prejudiced consensus. In the age of international integration, present 
revival of nationalistic populism and ultra-nationalism, the issue has 
become of utmost importance. 
Nationalism is a highly marketable notion. It proved to be a very 
attractive subject to manipulation. “It’s true that political salesmen can 
market mythology and iconography that entice people into privileging a 
religion, ethnicity, or a nation as their fundamental identity. With the right 
package of indoctrination and coercion, they can even turn them into 
cannon fodder. That does not mean that nationalism is a human drive. 
Nothing in human nature prevents a person from being a proud Frenchman, 
European, and citizen of the world, all at the same time.”56  
 
Challenges facing nations in the age of international integration  
The present societies are often called „post-national”, which is broadly 
meant that national states gradually lose their sense, and are melting in the 
process of globalization. “In summary, declinists argue that globalization 
presents the traditional state with a set of profound challenges which 
seriously question that institution’s appropriateness to contemporary 
circumstances. Economic forces are said to render the state unable to act 
except for slight manoeuvres around the fringes. Forces from above are 
challenging its monopoly on authority; they limit its capacity and 
transnational threats reveal its manifest inadequacies.” „The declinists’ 
argument involves three core propositions: (1) state autonomy has been 
undermined because global forces impose punishingly high costs on states 
that deviate from the basic neo-liberal model; (2) in key sectors the state no 
longer has the power and authority to alter outcomes; and (3) the state 
lacks the resources and structures to resolve the kind of security and social 
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problems it had in the past.”57  
There are several new trends and developments, which had 
fundamental impacts on character, role and future possibilities of nations. 
1. The recent decades are marked by the Information and 
Communication Revolution (ICR). Connected to it, in the last decades the 
knowledge and information became the most important production factor. In 
industrial societies traditionally they have been based on three main 
production factors (land, capital and labour). The major preoccupation of 
economists was rational allocation and utilization of these “scarce 
resources”. This scarcity was present till the 1970s, which was dramatically 
expressed theoretically in “Limits on Growth” (Meadows – 1972). This 
radically changed by ICR. “Information and knowledge are new production 
factors. They are unlimited, renewable, infinitely interchangeable and 
reusable resources.”58 Drucker is more explicit and introduced the notion of 
“knowledge work” and the “knowledge worker” already in the 1960, and 
defined productivity and innovation as the main sources of value creation.59 
The success in the acquisition of ICR has become a basic factor of 
competitiveness of a national economy.  
2. Parallel, the economic structures were also radically transformed. 
The share of primary sectors, connected to the territory or land (mining and 
agriculture), was radically reduced, they lost dynamism and were 
marginalized. Just following the war, even in the developed European 
countries the share of agriculture was around 25-40%. By now it is only 
about 2-4%, while from mining comes less than 1% of GDP. At the same 
time, from points of view of production and influences the information was 
upgraded, and became the most important factors of efficiency. “What is 
new that a growing chunk of production in the modern economy is in the 
form of intangibles, based on the exploitation of ideas rather material things, 
the so called ‘weightless economy’?”60 
3. The structural changes of economy were accompanied with drastic 
social restructuring and transformation of the whole political arena. Due to 
                                                          
57 Bisley, (2007): p. 63. 
58 Kahane, (2006): p. 24. 
 
59 Drucker, (1994): p. 6. 





transformation to service economy, the classical class conflicts were 
replaced by need for more cooperative social and political attitudes. The 
“knowledge worker” assumes, in place of simple implementation, more 
innovative and entrepreneurial capabilities and attitudes, and the traditional 
class frontlines have been blurred. Besides, the importance of the owners 
of physical and financial capital, the role of the “human capital” has been up 
valued. In spite of extreme power concentration in the hands of narrow 
business circles, the number and the importance of the middle class has 
greatly increased, and  in the outcomes of political struggles (election 
results and prospects) their role have become decisive. That meant erosion 
of traditional political parties (not only Communists, but also Social or 
Christian Democracy), while the consolidation of new political forces and 
structures is still delaying. The traditional political landscape divided to right 
and left, has greatly lost its relevance. The new division is rather between 
the moderate centre and the extreme populist parties (Pro-EU contra 
Eurosceptics; democrats contra authoritarians; integrationists contra 
discriminators and protectionists), while the differences between the ultra-
right and ultra-left are hardly discernible.  Among others, these changes 
pose new challenges to the stability of national states. 
4. The growing range of activities is organised globally and get 
outside the scope and possibilities of control and regulation of national 
state. “Many material conditions in the current globalizing world have made 
statist governance unviable. Computerized data transmissions, radio 
broadcastings, satellite remote sensing and telephone calls do not halt at 
customs posts. Internet use by trans-border criminal networks present 
states with major challenges. Electronic mass media also detract from a 
state’s domination over language construction and education.  Nor can a 
state exercise complete authority over transplanetary associations or global 
companies. With the development of global currencies, credit cards, even 
the most powerful state has lost unqualified authority over money supply 
and exchange rates. Nor can a state successfully assert supreme and 
exclusive rule over the global financial flows that pass through its 
jurisdiction (or do they?) Electronic commerce, intra-firm trade, offshore 
financial centres, derivatives and hedge funds have all substantially 
compromised state abilities to raise tax revenues. Transworld ecological 
developments such as ozone depletion and biodiversity loss have similarly 
contradicted the material territorialist preconditions of state governance.”61 
                                                          




5. Due to international integration and interdependence, the basic 
economic processes (growth, inflation, employment or equilibrium of the 
economy) and policies have become determined by external forces, and 
possibilities of influencing them by the national states have been drastically 
shrank. The operation, performance and welfare of nations are conditioned 
increasingly by global competitive forces. That was demonstrated 
particularly in the present financial crisis. “After the debt binge of the last 
decade, which lifted all nations, the new area is one of moderate, uneven 
growth, with much wider gaps in performance between rival economies and 
markets. It’s a tough age, but also very fair in the sense that there is no 
global tailwind for any nation, no matter whether it is developed or 
emerging. Now everyone has to row.”62  
6. The operation of the global markets represents a disciplining force 
against national states, and they are often supported by international 
institutions (IMF or World Bank) or policies of transnational companies. 
“Market discipline is said to have dramatically reduced the range and 
character of economic policy making. Its core is a deregulated open 
economy, in which tight fiscal policy is the order of the day, social welfare 
spending is kept to minimum, the taxation regime is firm-friendly, non-
progressive and structured around indirect mechanisms, such as 
consumption taxes, the labour market must be flexible, and monetary policy 
is run by an independent central bank fixed on a low-inflation target. 
Attempts to deviate from this minimalist model will result in global markets 
imposing severe penalties.” 63  In fact, these strict limits to policies of 
national governments, both socially and politically (democratically) are 
highly controversial. At the same time, it can be acknowledged, that they 
can exert a positive disciplining force towards irresponsible and corrupt 
government policies. 
7. The new technologies and structural changes were associated with 
increased mobility and flexibility of societies and economies. One important 
factor were the “low cost flights, high speed trains, Internet connection and 
innovations in IT communication technologies, which radically compress 
space and time, strengthening nomadism against previous fixity.“64 The ICR 
had broad impacts on everyday life. One typical example is the “medicine, 
whose modern advancements impacts lifestyles, family planning, family 
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organization (hetero or homo), traditional cultures and habits.” 65  „In 
summary, globalization is characterized by change in political, economic, 
military and environmental life due to reorganization of spatial relationships 
in which geography and territory no longer play the kind of determinative 
role that they played in the past.” 66  This is often called as 
“deterritorialization”, affecting one of the basic attributes and factor of 
strategic position of a nation.  
8. There are broad ranges of new, social, political and cultural 
developments, which challenge the traditional concept of the nation. We 
can see, that “human societies have increased in complexity and 
interdependence. The liquefaction of pre-existing social links is 
indisputable. Traditional habits, family setting, class relations, urban/rural 
geography, gender relations, the perception of neighborhood – all of these 
are undergoing drastic transformation, affecting the predominant discourse 
based on imagined homogeneity, one standardized language, one 
predominant religion , one defined territory with fixed population, and a well-
defined ‘cultural recognition’ between rulers and ruled.” 67  
9. The changes call for new structures of governance.  From points of 
view of national governance, the process is characterized by two opposing 
tendencies. On the one hand, we can experience the transfer of 
competences and sovereignty down to local and regional levels. On the 
other hand, the competences and the regulation are shifting upwards to the 
levels of interstate regional and global integration. It means the appearance 
of multi-level governance, which is a product of international integration and 
growing interdependence. It tries to respond to the challenges of control 
and regulation of a multi-actor system, and to harmonize and compromise 
among the interests of interested. Adjustment to the requirements of 
international integration and multi-level governance calls for fundamental 
changes in system of objectives and tools, the institutional and regulatory 
structures of the traditional national policies. They assume increased and 
large scale openness and cooperation capacities. 
Nations, however, still represent one of the most important 
components of present-day integration processes. “At the beginning of the 
21st century, states have remained as the basic ‘building blocks’ of 
international order; governments are the basic actors and shapers of the 
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world order.”68 In a certain sense, we can even talk about the upgrading of 
the roles of nations. „Rather than killing off the state, the chapter concludes 
that globalization is changing the environment in which it operates, both 
domestically and internationally, and is thus contributing to a shift in the role 
that states play in the domestic and international spheres. States are a 
product of the political, cultural, economic and military circumstances of 
their times. Just as they were changed by industrialization, so they are 
subject of change today. The challenge is to determine the extent and 
character of the shift in state behaviour and the role played by global forces 
in these transformations.” 69 Change of attitudes and success of adjustment 
are upgraded. 
Global challenges change the positions and the role of nations. As the 
famous historian puts it: ”Like it or not, humankind today faces three 
common problems that make  a mockery of all national borders, and that 
can be solved only though global cooperation. These are nuclear war, 
climate change and technological disruption.” 70  As even large nations 
cannot solve them alone, they are forced to international cooperation. “It 
does not mean establishing a global government or abolishing all cultural, 
religious and national differences. I can be loyal at one and the same time 
to several identities – to my family, my village, my profession, my country 
and also to my planet and to the whole human species. Sometime we put 
work before family, sometimes family before work. Similarly, sometime we 
need to put the national interests first, but there are occasions when we 
need to privilege the global interests of humankind.”71 
The national states remained determining factors of multi-level 
governance. “The nation-state is central to this process of ‘suturing’: the 
policies and practices in distributing power upwards to the international 
level and downwards to subnational agencies are the ties that will hold the 
system of governance together.” 72 It is important to stress the „national 
level” has the most complex and efficient institutional and regulatory 
structure with the broadest democratic and legal mandate. 
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The national government is far not defenceless against the impacts of 
globalization. On contrary: “Moreover, governments can shape the effects 
of globalization on their territories and populations: with fiscal policies, 
monetary policies, consumer policies, labour policies, environmental 
policies, data protection, and so on.”73 “Although the economic role of the 
state has declined in certain significant ways, it has expanded in others, 
and therefore, it is inaccurate to conclude that nation state has become 
redundant and anachronistic. Indeed, the importance of the state in some 
areas, certainly with respect to promoting international competitiveness. 
Even though, its role may have diminished somewhat, the nations-state 
remains preeminent in both domestic and international economic affairs.”74 
 
Integration theories and the nation 
 As the role, functions and future of the nations in the presently 
evolving international integration are concerned there are several 
theoretical schools. Among them, the federalist, the functionalist and the 
intergovernmentalists should be particularly mentioned. The first two raise 
doubts and criticism about the capabilities of nations, particularly in terms of 
securing peace and efficient democratic governance, while the 
intergovermentalism tries to re-define the role the national states in the 
process of international integration. 
The federalists favour supranational, effective community power 
structures and institutions (E. B. Haas, J. Pinder, G. Montani, etc.). 
Federalism has acquired increasing political influence in the EU countries, 
and has exerted effective pressure in the direction of political union. The 
majority of federalists support worldwide political integration (world 
government). The main aim of “Eurofederalists” is the creation of the United 
States of Europe. 
The idea of federalism has a long history, in fact, one of the longest in 
the history of discussions related to a new international order. “The first 
draws on the legacy of ideas associated with Immanuel Kant, who 
advocated an expanding federation as the most appropriate constitutional 
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safeguard against the threat of war. The second draws on those elements 
of democratic theory concerned with devising ways of ensuring efficient 
governance within a democratic framework so that authority is supplied as 
closely as possible to the people. The third strand is the scholarly contemn 
of federalizing tendencies and processes.” 75  
One of the outstanding proponents writes that federalists “point out 
that the national states have lost their proper rights since they cannot 
guarantee the political and economic safety of their citizens. They also 
insist that European Union should be brought about by the European 
populations, and not by diplomats, by directly electing a European 
constituent assembly.” 76  The EU has pledged to democratic values, 
codified them into the acqui communautaire, and misbehaviours are 
sanctioned (7. Paragraph of Lisbon Treaty).  
Many argue that to take the nation as the major responsible for wars 
is a great simplification. Wars in the history were rooted in several interests 
and factors, and the national conflicts were far not the most important ones. 
We know the history of bloody religious wars, but wars were conducted for 
acquiring resources, influences or just prestige. In fact, the one of the 
bloodiest conflicts were the intra-religious wars (formerly the Catholic – 
Protestant, and recently the Sunnites - Shiites). No question, that they 
deeply wound the nations. 
Some also question the democratic character and commitments of 
federations, as they simply „would dissolve the nationalities of Europe in a 
historically meaningless collectively, united neither by language or religion, 
nor by customs, nor by inherited sovereignty and law.”77 Accordingly, „the 
lesson that we should draw, therefore, is that since the nation state proved 
to be a stable foundation of democratic government and secular jurisdiction, 
we ought to improve it, to adjust it, even to dilute it, but not to throw it 
away.”78  
For the functionalist integration theories, the most important question 
is the appropriateness and effectiveness of regulation. The functionalist 
schools place the emphasis directly on better functioning of the integration 
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system. According to the functionalists, the nation state is increasingly 
incapable of fulfilling its basic social, economic and political tasks. 
Therefore, more and more shared aims and functions should be delegated 
to the more efficient integration organizations, which are able to implement 
these more perfectly. The functions may be economic, political, social, 
infrastructural or military. In these spheres they can represent more efficient 
solutions to “tasks” like economic growth or the acceleration of 
technological progress, development of infrastructures at international level 
(construction of a community road network or communications system), 
equalization of development levels or in fact greater military security.  
The functionalists are aware that shifts in the exercising of functions 
presuppose institutional changes. Functionalists and federalists often seem 
to be on the same platform inasmuch as they aim in the long run at 
supranational institutions. “The theory of functionalism in international 
relations is based on the hope that more and more common tasks will be 
delegated to such specific functional organizations and that each of these 
organizations will become in time supranational; that is, superior to its 
member governments in power and authority. In this way, says this theory, 
the world’s nations will gradually become integrated into a single community 
within which war will be impossible.” 79 
The so-called neo-functionalists (E.B. Haas and Leon Lindberg) 
emphasize prosperity, internal peace and external security, the role of 
national political elites, and in contrast to the global view, the possibility of 
regional integration. The functionalists, like the federalists, were originally in 
favour of universal peace and were against regional integration. David 
Mitrany, in fact, rejected European integration. “Functionalism was primarily 
a theory of post-territorial governance, whereas neo-functionalism was an 
early theory of regionalism. Indeed, there did appear to be real signs from 
the early 1960s that regional integration was developing into a world-wide 
trend.” 80   
“For many, ‘integration theory’ and ‘neofunctionalism’ are virtual 
synonyms. It might even be described as the ‘authorized version’ of 
European integration. Neofunctionalism acquired the status of an ideology 
in Brussels.”81 “Neofunctionalism (in its early manifestations at least) might 
be thought of as an attempt to theorize the strategies of funding elites of 
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post-war European unity.”82  
The EU project so far remained contradictory. The integration projects 
were accompanied by important institutional changes, and the Treaties of 
Rome were modified and developed in several waves (the Single European 
Act, the Maastricht Treaty of European Union, then the Amsterdam, Nice 
and Lisbon Treaties). No one denies that the scope and competence of the 
European institutions have been widened, but theorists and politicians 
remain deeply divided as to how far the changes have affected the 
character of these institutions.  
Many maintain that in spite of the ups and downs of the integration 
processes, the national factors in working of European institutions and 
decision-making prevailed, and there has not been any breakthrough 
toward supranational federal structures. The predominant direction of 
integration was liberalization (the single market), and even the positive 
integration measures were subordinated to the aim of the perfect 
functioning of that liberalized market. Monetary union, to a large extent, 
followed from the single market project, and the transfer of monetary policy 
to union level has not yet changed this trend. At the same time, the national 
states were successful in maintaining their primacy in strategic decisions 
and the new elements of supranationality remained limited to narrow fields 
of monetary integration. 
The theory which tries to describe these types of developments is 
called liberal inter-governmentalism, and Andrew Moravcsik is considered 
one of its main proponents. This is a model of a two-level game to explain 
European integration consisting of a liberal theory of the national preference 
formation and an intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining 
between states. Moravcsik, for his part, by developing a state-centric theory 
of liberal intergovernmentalism, describes the Union as a regime that 
makes inter-state bargaining more efficient, whilst enhancing the role of 
national leaders.83  
As opposed to the neofunctionalists, intergovernmentalist theorists 
deny the need for supranational institutions. “The resultant conversation 
between neofunctionalists and governmentalists is usually presented as the 
main ongoing schism in the integration theory literature since the mid-
1960s. In many ways they present stark alternatives. In terms of identifying 
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key actors, intergovernmentalists emphasize the centrality of national 
executives, whereas neofunctionalists point to supranational institutions 
such as the Commission as well as national and transnational interest 
organizations. Neofunctionalism is a theory of change and transformation, 
whereas intergovernmentalists emphasize international politics as usual, 
albeit under novel conditions.”84  
While in general the federalists were strongly criticized and attacked, 
no one could, however, deny that the European Communities and later, 
particularly the European Union amounted to something more, and 
probably much more, than a simple international institution, even if not yet a 
supranational, classical federal structure. Several new concepts were 
developed which tried to formulate that specific, unique and in many 
respects “in-between” character of the institutional set up of European 
integration. 
From the point of view of regulatory theories G. Majone made an 
important contribution to this discussion; he considers the EU as more and 
more an instance of a “regulatory state”, or at least one which is on the way 
to becoming such an entity. According to him, the regulatory state “may be 
less of a state in the traditional sense than a web of networks of national 
and supranational regulatory institutions held together by shared values and 
objectives, and by a common style of policy-making.”85 (Regulation can be 
defined as addressing problems of market imperfection and failure.)  
The theories on multi-level governance extend this discussion into 
new dimensions. Multi-level governance, in fact, may mean the emergence 
of a new structure, where the constitutional foundations of sovereignty may 
remain largely unchanged, leaving national member states as basic entities, 
but at the same time, it challenges the functional or operational autonomy of 
states by sharing decisions, and pursuing certain policies in a shared way. 
The multi-level governance, both in political and regulatory terms mean new 
qualities. In fact, it is a “search for more effective and cost-reducing means 
of organizing, structuring and executing collective policy programmes that 
nevertheless remain crucial for the political viability of the constituent 
units.”86 In other words, while power and power sharing remain basically in 
intergovernmental character, even on the longer run, along the line with the 
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principle of subsidiarity, the Union level of governance takes more growing 
supranational pattern. That might be the major field of creeping 
supranationalism, supported by the pressure of increasing efficiency of the 
governance in general. Policy developments and reforms already tend to 
that direction. 
One of the most important and controversial ideas of the neo-
functionalism is the notion of “spill-over”, which tried to describe the driving 
mechanisms of regional integration.  Lindberg defined spill-over as “a 
situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a 
situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
action, which in turn creates a further condition and a need for more action, 
and so forth.”87   
By the intergovernentalists, the theory of spill-over was sharply 
rejected. They particularly criticized the notion of any automatism or 
functional dynamism which would drive integration processes. Instead, they 
emphasized the importance of national interests, and the primary role of 
national actors. As Moravcsik writes: “the process of Community-building 
has proceeded in fits and starts through a series of intergovernmental 
bargains. Nor has the process by which integration takes place supported 
the neo-functionalist view. Integration has only intermittently spilled over 
into related sectors and policies and, at least until recently, the autonomous 
influence of supranational officials has increased slowly and unevenly, if at 
all…the empirical evidence does not seem to confirm the stress placed by 
neo-functionalist on political spillover and the autonomy of supranational 
officials. But other premises, particularly the focus on economic interests, 
may still be viable. It remains plausible, for example, to argue that 
integration is a distinctive policy response of modern welfare state to rising 
interdependence.”88   
The arguments of neofunctionalists were reinforced by the new 
developments of the 1980s, particularly the launching of the programme of 
the single European market, and then the amendment of the Single 
European Act. “The SEA was hailed by many observers at the time as 
opening up new horizons for positive integration. Neofunctionalism was in 
fact the only theory that could place, if not justify, such claims in a dynamic 
perspective, linking institutional reform, albeit of a limited nature, to the 
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expansive logic of community action.” 89  At the same time, opponents 
argued that these developments did not change the character of the 
Community, inasmuch as they “have followed the same pattern: the joint 
exercise of the authority by state executives has not led, either gradually or 
automatically, to the erosion of sovereign statehood, but rather has 
strengthened the capacity of states to promote and in the long run secure a 
fair share of their interests within the general system, whilst preserving an 
area of autonomous domestic jurisdiction crucial to their identity as 
states.”90 The liberal intergovernmentalist arguments are repeated in this 
context as well. 
Alan Milward not only denies the conflict between the nation state and 
the European Community, but he rather stresses the close relation, 
interaction and interdependence of national and European integration right 
from 1945. “But is there in fact an antithesis between the European 
Community and the nation-state? Does the evolution of the Community 
imply the replacement of the nation-state as an organizational framework 
and its eventual supersession? It is the argument of this book that there is 
no such antitheses and that the evolution of the European Community since 
1945 has been an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an 
organizational concept. The argument goes, however, beyond this, because 
the historical evidence points to the further conclusion that without the 
process of integration the west European nation-state might well not have 
retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way it has. The 
European Community has been its buttress, an indispensable part of the 
nation-state’s post-war construction. Without it, the nation-state could not 
have offered to its citizens the same measure of security and prosperity 
which it has provided and which has justified its survival. After 1945 the 
European nation-state rescued itself from collapse, created a new political 
consensus as a basis of its legitimacy, and through changes in its response 
to its citizens which meant a sweeping extension of its functions and 
ambitions reasserted itself as the fundamental unit of political 
organization.”91 
Indeed, the federalist-functionalist versus intergovernmental discourse 
seems somewhat misleading. In light of the complexity of integration 
processes, the parallel existence and interaction of national and 
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international integration is a fact, and they offer a relevant and useful guide 
of research and analysis of regulatory structures. Particularly, this is the 
case, if we think in terms of constructive nationalism, which seems to be 
implied assumption of all of these schools. “To a considerable extent, 
neofunctionalists and intergovenmentalists talked past each other. 
Neofunctionmalists were most concerned with the major day-to-day policy 
making, while intergovernemalists were concerned with the major 
treaties.” 92  Needless to say, academic discussions should not be 
constrained in any way, but in many respects these concepts are 
reconcilable, and call rather for dialogue, which from points of view of 
producing relevant reform proposals, would be highly desirable. 
 
National attitudes and policy responses on international 
integration 
 
In relation to international integration, we distinguish among four types 
of national attitudes and policy responses: namely constructive, obstructive, 
negligent and destructive ones. We make our analysis in context of these 
dimensions.  
1. The constructive national policies mean nation building in its totality 
and complexity (without any ethnical, political or social discrimination), the 
ability of articulating, defending, compromising and asserting national 
interests, and of maximizing benefits offered by international integration. 
Beyond devotion to the cause of the nation, it assumes cooperative 
attitudes towards the partners, political responsibility and professionalism, 
skills and democratic culture.  
In case of constructive national policies, we can speak about policy 
decisions and measures, which equally serve the national and the common 
interests of the Union, namely when in the multi-level governance 
structures, all levels are harmonised and coordinated. We can consider it as 
a positive sum game. 
The deficiencies, and at the end, the roots of the crisis of the 
monetary integration were partly conceptual and constructional and partly 
                                                          




operational. The Euro architecture is an experimental construction. It had 
several elements of constructional weaknesses and deficiencies: lack real 
common budget and the connected “automatic stabilization”, failure of the 
no bail out rule and addressing the sovereign debt crisis or deficits of 
regulation of banking sphere and financial markets.   
After 2010, the reform measures of “European governance” made 
substantial steps to correct this situation. In this respect, the creation of new 
economic policy coordination mechanisms (European Semester); setting up 
new support facilities (European Stability Mechanisms); creation of 
comprehensive fiscal frameworks (Fiscal Compound); or decision of 
Banking Union, all were very important steps forward. They consolidated 
the functioning of the euro-zone, and averted of a crisis threatening to 
collapse of the whole system. The whole process was an example of 
constructive behavior and policies both in terms of national and community 
interests. The same applies to the proposals on the future (Plan for EMU2, 
Macron-Merkell Plan, Reflection Paper of the Commission in May 2017 etc., 
which can contribute to further consolidation of the Euro project.  
2. The destructive nationalism, threatens the whole international 
system, and with uncompromising attitudes and policies, in spite of its loud 
and aggressive populist nationalist rhetoric, in reality hurts its own national 
interests. The aggressive prioritising of national interests is a negative sum 
game, which damages eventually everybody. Historically, the exclusive, 
discriminative, protectionist and confronting nationalisms of the 19th and 
early 20th century were largely responsible for two bloody world wars, 
causing the suffering and death of millions of people. 
The main claims and policy proposals of the newly emerged neo- or 
ultra-nationalism are on a large extended expression of destructive 
nationalism. They reject basic European values and principles and their 
positive economic and social proposals are mostly selective and 
discriminatory. The destructive nationalism is driven by hostile emotions and 
intentions towards integration and among others against the EU. Populists 
question either participation of their country in integration organization, or in 
most cases, the terms of its conditions. 
The populist or Euroscpetical policies fall into this category, which are 
based primarily on emotional or ideological considerations. Usually, it is 
about politicians, who propose and pursue policies, which promote only 




spite shouting about “nation” from early morning till late night, was the 
greatest enemy of the German nation. The Nazi concepts of the nation are 
still haunting Europe, and leading to undesirable and even tragic division 
among the nations and inside the societies. 
The typical cases of destructions are the environmental policies of 
many countries, and broad business circles. These policies not only reduce 
the general levels of welfare, but by endangering the health of the society 
and life of the peoples for the future. Particularly in global terms, these 
types of activities are beyond the reach of jurisdictions. 
The other main form of destruction is corruption, which is a serious 
social disease. It is reduction of efficiency and welfare. It is particularly 
detrimental for a nation, when it embraces broad business and political 
circles and supported by “national” policies. 
3. Obstructive policies are not necessarily driven by rejection and 
hostility; these types of actions can be and are taken even by countries 
strongly committed to the EU, and integration policies. Obstructive policies 
can characterize small or large countries; centrum and periphery; new or 
old members. There are three types obstructive policies: 1) Unilateral 
prioritizing national interests over the community ones, (which can be over 
one another country or group of countries); 2) Giving preference to partial, 
sectoral or local interests over the general national and community ones, 
usually as a result of lobbying of strong pressure groups in all dimensions of 
multi-level coordination; 3) Putting into the foreground of short-term 
considerations over the long-term interests. Obstructive policies are usually 
constrained by public opinion or electoral consideration.  
Obstructive policies express deficiencies or failures of coordination at 
any point of the chain of multi-level governance. The rent hunting of certain 
groups can bring unilateral benefits, but they usually mean only suboptimal 
gains.  The obstructive and destructive nationalism often overlaps or 
intertwine, each strives for unilateral benefits, and largely can be negative 
sum games. The unilateral benefits often can come from free riding.  
One of the typical examples of the long history of obstructing policies 
is CAP. The CAP gives preferences to one of the sectors of the economy. 
For long it helped the modernization, Western European agriculture, but 
later on, claiming it as an established right got growingly obstructing 




marginal, but powerful social and political groups, while it contradicts not 
only to the general national, but even the overall agrarian interests. CAP in 
its present structures basically fails to contribute to the global 
competitiveness of European agriculture. Of course, the support of 
agriculture is necessary from several points of view, what is opposed that is 
the present construction of the CAP. 
 Concerning the monetary integration, the reform measures of the last 
decade have been far not enough for fully getting out of the crisis. They 
need further consolidation and reform measures. In these respects, there 
are broad elements of obstruction. Further reforms would be particularly 
urgent in case of the need for real community budget and addressing the 
sovereign debt crisis.  
The EU budget would be in the interest of the whole union. Both for 
the stabilization of the monetary union, and to take a dynamic growth path, 
the budget reforms are urgent. But as the required measure is unpopular; 
the reforms, so far, not surprisingly, have been obstructed on the basis of 
diverging national interests. Obstructing union interests in the short run, 
again costs lot in the long run.  
Modern market economy budgets mean primarily the financing or 
buying of certain public goods and services by paying taxes. We pay taxes 
for access to education, medical services or security, including public peace 
and cohesion. For the sake of acceptance of reforms, identification of 
community functions, which potentially are quite substantial, would greatly 
help to change the present situation. If contributions can be convincingly 
connected to important services and functions provided by the Union, they 
might be more acceptable. 
One of the typical examples of obstructive policy concepts and 
attitudes is the slogan of “no transfer union”, favoured particularly by net 
budgetary contributor countries. No doubt, that the idea is justifiable, as it is 
important, that irresponsible policies and free riding should not be 
encouraged. But at the same time it is a misleading to see “transfers” only 
in budgetary terms. The overwhelming parts of gains from “transfers” are 
related to markets.  
Not surprisingly, the issue is both politically and socially delicate. 
While the beneficiaries of market transfers are the large companies, the 




in budgetary reform, is meeting strong opposition and obstruction from large 
business circles (make company taxes part of the “own resources”, not to 
speak about replacing VAT element by them). No doubt that the impacts of 
taxes on competitiveness should be carefully considered, but a real 
common budget able to exert the functions of “automatic stabilization”, on 
the longer run, through its consequences on consolidation would be 
beneficial for every actors of the economy, including the business sector. 
The other main reform challenge for the Union is addressing the 
sovereign debt crisis, where so far any serious steps forward have also 
have failed. The debt crisis cripples the economies of the South, and it has 
a paralysing effect on the whole union. The treatments are always ad hoc 
and on an occasional basis, and everyone is aware that these debts will 
never be paid back. The direct social costs of mistaken debt management 
are enormous and keep on cumulating. Indirect cost, as a result of the 
losses in economic growth and other fields, amount substantial.  
The attitudes to both the debt crisis and the budgetary reform are 
typically obstructive.  Hesitating to take, in case, the no doubt substantial 
short term costs means losses, endlessly cumulating and multiplying in the 
longer future. 
4. The negligent policies are about misunderstandings, mistakes, 
ignorance, incompetence or irresponsibility. In milder forms, it can mean 
faulty concepts or constructional, conceptual, operational or behavioural 
mistakes. These are often about politician bargaining for maximizing votes, 
while neglecting or ignoring the real position and interests of their own 
country. Negligence is generally characteristic of destructive policies and 
vice versa. And they are also negative sum games. Brexit, in many 
respects, is an example of that. 
The euro project was born in the atmosphere of ultra-liberalism of the 
1990s, and was primarily based on the assumed regulatory and disciplining 
role of the market. It was believed that the strict prescription of the 
monetary criteria will reduce member countries’ room for maneuver in 
economic policy, and under the pressure of greater discipline, they can 
improve performance and competitiveness only in the sphere of the real 
economy. Accordingly, since devaluation was not possible, money markets 
were expected to exercise even stricter selectivity with regard to national 




If we look back to the last decades, in term efficiency and success of 
the assumed market regulation, the picture is disappointing. In reality, 
markets with low or negative real interest rates gave the wrong signals, and 
encouraged rather than prevented the accumulation of debt. As the danger 
of devaluing ceased, risk premiums dropped and all the Eurozone members 
received favourable credit ratings (the problematic countries were 
upgraded). In reality, instead of “disciplining” governments, the debts could 
be increased with diminished risks. As it turned out later, the markets rather 
encouraged irresponsible behaviors and they instead of disciplining in 
advance, rather punished afterwards, in fact very strictly. When the 
assumed “disciplining” mechanisms entered into force, it was too late, and 
they rather pushed countries into a downward spiral. The regulatory role of 
currency exchange rate was also overestimated.  
Misunderstanding and overestimating the regulatory role of the 
market was typically a certain sort of benign neglect, capturing all the actors 
from governments to business or from national to community levels, which 
then was largely contributing to the crisis. 
At the same time, the importance and role of broader social regulatory 
frameworks, both theoretically and in policy terms were largely 
underestimated. It is not by chance, that we speak about “social regulation”. 
It is not just about the state intervention, but it refers to the broad 
democratic regulatory role of non-governmental institutions, like chambers 
of industries, trade unions, organization for protection of the environment, 
consumers, or anti-monopolistic regulations or great number of civil 
organizations.  
The crisis, particularly in indebted countries, has led to harsh austerity 
measures. Economic policies still suffered from ultra-liberalist rigidities and 
social insensibilities. Too much emphasis was given to deflationary stability, 
which came at a very high price for many people in the form of austerity 
packages. Beyond the costs of deflation, the social and political 
repercussions seem substantial. 
Looking back to about two decades, the obstructive national policies 
(unilateral following national or partial interests) were general, and often 
they were mixed with negligent attitudes as well. As a typical case of 
obstruction, large spheres of national policies were subordinated to short-
term election considerations, as opposed to the long-term stability of the 




Irresponsible attitudes of debtors were accompanied by the irresponsible 
policies of creditors (commercial banks of the core countries) as well. 
 
Integration on new track – from neo-functionalism to post-
functionalism 
From the 1990s with the launching of Economic and Monetary Union 
the European integration process entered a qualitatively new phase. 
Customs unions, the common market and single market represented 
liberalization (“negative integration”), that is, the complete opening of 
markets to one another. Even customs union and the single market required 
certain common policies, but these mainly served to ensure the normal 
functioning of the market.  
Economic union meant qualitatively more, since the establishment of 
new institutions and economic policies was required (“positive integration”), 
and the reallocation of former functions to union level. Economic union goes 
beyond the common or single market and implements comprehensive 
integration over a wide range of economic policies.  
In the wider sense, economic union involved three main stages of 
economic policy integration: (1) uniformization and harmonization of 
economic policies (VAT); (2) economic policy coordination can be defined 
as concerted action by selecting economic policy aims and the means for 
implementing them (EMS –ERM); and 3) community-level unification of 
national economic policies (community, “common” or union policies – (CAP, 
monetary policy, and ECB). 
 “Common policies” mean transfer of competences and executive 
potentials to Union level, taking over totally or partly the role of national 
policies. When analysing policies, we should focus on objectives, means 
and measures and the attainment of each of them. The common policies 
growingly assume supranational institutional and decision making 
frameworks, and mean steps towards federal structures. 
By the 1990s, through the high intensity of cooperation, 
interconnectedness and interdependence of EU economies the real-
integration (“integratedness”), reached also a new level.  




important development, which “clearly marked the passage of the 
community’s evolution ‘from policy to polity’.”93 Although the member states 
did not consider abandoning their devotion to national sovereignty, “there 
was evidence that the TEU brought the new structures closer to being 
considered as a political system in its own right with significant capacity for 
governance.” 94  By that, none could deny that national sovereignty was 
affected, which was received, however, with mixed feelings of the different 
member states. “With the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary 
Union, the integration process has reached a point where any further 
deepening would require additional transfer of sovereignty on fiscal, social 
and political levels and has moved closer to the ultimate goal of political 
federalism that is definitely not objective for many Member States.”95  It 
should be added, that with the 2008 crisis, the deficiencies of the project 
came to surface, and led to its own crisis of the whole integration process. 
By early 2000s, together with implementing the single market and 
monetary union project, all these meant qualitatively new stage of EU 
integration. 
The new challenges were substantial, which brought qualitative 
changes both in community level and in the structure of national integration.  
In term of late, we should speak about not only a qualitatively higher level of 
intensity of both external and internal dimensions of national integration, but 
their relations have become closer. It was a turning point in the sense, that 
integration reached a level, when further steps can face serious counter-
interests and opposition, and are possible only through tough bargaining, 
coordination and consensus seeking. And, as broader economic, social and 
political interests are at stake, these no longer are matters of the elite, but 
call for broad democratic public support. 
 “European politics has become multi-level in a way that few, if any 
anticipated. The European Union is no longer insulated from domestic 
politics, and domestic politics is no longer insulated from Europe. The result 
is greater divergence of politically relevant perceptions and accordingly 
constricted scope of agreement.”96  “Domestic politics has become more 
tightly coupled with political outcomes. Treaty bargaining among national 
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governments is mightily constrained by fear of referendum defeat. Party 
leaders on government worry about the electoral consequences of 
European policies. A wide gap between public and elite, an increase of 
intra-party conflicts, a series of referendum defeats and the deep reluctance 
on the part of governments to hazard public debate on further integration, 
all signal these new developments.”97  
The traditional assumptions and tendencies of neo-functionalism had 
to be revised. The term of post-functionalism was introduced, which better 
captivated, among others, the qualitatively new relations between the union 
and national policies and regulation and the necessity of coordination and 
consensus. In general theoretical terms, the post-functionalism is the 
recognition of the qualitatively new trends, and in particular the new closer 
relation of the external and internal dimensions of national integration. 
The new changes call for new approaches, both in concepts and 
practice of regulation. They bring fundamental changes, both in terms of 
multi-level governance and in relations among different levels. 
The development changed the position of nations, and new ways of 
thinking and policies are required, if any reforms could be successfully 
worked out and implemented. “Neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism generalize from the first three decades of integration, 
when creation of a European legal system was driven by the demand for 
adjudication of economic disputes between firms. The implication, for most 
people (except groups of farmers), were limited or not transparent. Public 
opinion was quiescent. These were years of ‘permissive consensus’ of 
deals cut by insulating elites. The period since 1991 might be described, by 
contrast, as one of ‘constraining discensus’. Elites, that is party leaders, 
must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues”.98   
These are fundamental changes, and the neo-functionalist spill over is 
replaced by the possibility of post-functionalist backlash bringing a 
remarkable turn in positions of politicians, while upgrading the role of 
nations in international integration systems. But what should be particularly 
stressed that it meant not only new challenges in terms of external 
integration, but the internal adjustment and alignment (integration) have got 
of strategic importance. In fact, this is the main characteristics of the 
qualitatively new course, and the decisive factor of any new reform and 
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The changing of the track by European integration from the 1980s 
started in the atmosphere of neo-liberalism.  
The role of monetarist revolution of 1970s years was decisive in the 
process. The discussions and first attempts of economic and monetary 
union in Europe, in the 1970s, coincided with the collapse of the 
international monetary system, which in the thousand years of history of 
money represented a qualitative turning point. The demonetization of gold 
practically meant the end of commodity monies, which were replaced by 
“monies” with undefined adjectives (“credit”, “fiat” or “fiduciary”) and with 
undefined materials (“paper”, “plastic” or “dot”). The new system was called 
monetarism, which meant not only a theory, but also a regulatory 
framework, replacing former structures based on the gold standard. 
At the beginning, the monetarism could be considered as a neoliberal 
theory, proposing new regulatory structures, while preserving social 
sensitivities.  Although, monetarism was identified with overall liberalisation, 
but it did not mean elimination of regulation, but rather transforming it. The 
monetarism fell into the row of history of neoliberalism, which since the 
1930-1940s, as a political course re-appeared in policies of several political 
parties, and after the war from time to time it became the ideological basis 
of economic and social policies (ordo-liberalism or social market economy 
etc.) of many countries. It stepped up as critics and opponents of the so 
called Keynesian policy, prevailing in the previous decades in most of the 
developed countries.  Contrary to demand the creation of Keynesianism, it 
meant demand control, management of quantitative money supply (later 
inflation targeting), creation of independent central bank, strict control of 
budgetary expenditures, and reform of outdated welfare state.   
Similarly to traditional neoliberal philosophies, it remained sensitive to 
social issues. Instead of unemployment (Keynesianism), for it the number 
one public enemy was inflation. One can only reflect, from the two, which is 
the most destructive social disease. Milton Friedman was the first, who 
proposed the introduction of negative income tax, which is a version of a 
guaranteed income for everybody. In the EU, the EMU was formulated 
along the monetarist premises. 
Since the 1980s, however, the economic policies more and more 




liberalization of global capital markets was excessive, eliminating regulation 
and controls beyond rational stability considerations, and greatly 
contributing to the crisis after 2008. The elements of market 
fundamentalism came into the foreground in policies of such countries as 
UK (by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from 1979), USA (President 
Ronald Reagan from 1980) or Chile (Pinochet), and the monetarist 
philosophy was combined with broad attacks against the traditional welfare 
state. In global terms, the Washington Consensus became the guideline of 
world economic policies, and the shock therapies in the transformation 
policies of former socialist countries. The monetary and budgetary balances 
got absolute priority, and in choosing policy alternatives the social 
considerations were largely neglected. On the whole, this meant a certain 
sort of break with traditional neoliberalism, and it is probably not mistaken to 
label them as ultra-liberalism. 
   These ultra-liberalist trends can be caught later in the 
implementation of the single market and stabilization policies of the 
Eurozone. The austerity policies and measures were to a large extent 
socially negligent, they lead to social degradation in several crisis countries, 
threatening even the middle classes. The increase of extreme inequities led 
to a cohesion crisis, which culminated particularly after the 2009 crisis. All 
these meant rejection of the former integration model, and call for a new 
one, which more properly corresponds to the changes and new challenges. 
 
Emergence of neo- or ultra-nationalism 
The one of the new developments, in the about the last decade, 
related to the crisis of international integration is the emergence and 
growing influence of neo-nationalism. The neo-nationalism is not a 
theoretical school, neither a political movement. It is basically a political 
course or trend, which is connected with the appearance of some new 
political parties or as a new course of existing parties (Alternative for 
Germany, the True Finns, Sweden Democrats, the National Front in France, 
Freedom Party of Austria, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands or Social 
Liberal Party in Brazil etc.). Many are rooted in the past, but in the present 
political discourse, they can be considered as largely new developments.  
The neo-nationalist courses are characterised by greatly diverging 




characterized by some traditional common features of extreme nationalism. 
”Perhaps the greatest change in the ideology of these parties is the 
increase in nationalist claims. Contemporary parties oppose 
multiculturalism and increasingly favour a traditional, national way of life. 
Parties have also become more concerned with law and order.” 99  It is 
accompanied with the revival of ultranationalist or Nazi type of movements, 
advocating racist ideologies, nativism, tribalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, 
or Islamophobia. In Europe, they are represented by the large number of 
Eurosceptical movements, which feel justified by crises of EU integration.  
According to these, on the whole, it is probably not mistaken to label them 
with ultra-nationalism.   
The neo- or ultra-nationalism was based on several developments. 
The changes, which generated increasing of rejection or opposition to 
global, and Europe integration, were complex. As it was pointed out, the 
period after 1990 was characterized by extreme differentiation of incomes 
and social benefits of integration, which was aggravated by the post 2008 
crisis. This raised resentment and rejection by the public opinion, and both 
national governments and European integration were seen responsible. 
The different public opinion surveys support this development. The 
destructive nationalistic attitudes got good munition for its populist agenda, 
and that was largely exploited. “Most of main stream parties continued to 
resist politicization of the issue. But members of populist, non-governing 
parties smelt the blood. On the left, opposition to European integration 
expressed antipathy to capitalism, on the populist right, it expressed 
defense of national community.” 100  Distribution conflicts related to 
advantages of integration, both on global and EU levels were important 
factors.  
The neo-nationalism was generated by several other specific factors: 
A growing feeling that the traditional values, cultural heritages and 
ways of life are threatened by globalization (nostalgia for past “secure” 
and closed societies); 
Growing secularisation is conceived as a threat (both Muslims and 
Christians feel that way), particularly among the religious people;  
Migration crisis and threats of global terrorism; 
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Desperate efforts made to restore the lost world or super-power 
status (Putin, Brexiteers), or to stop losing it (Trump).   
In a study analysing of party manifestos and election results of 
Western European countries, it is proposed “that ‘neo-nationalist’ is an 
accurate term for modern radical right parties for several reasons. First, the 
name correctly identifies them as a set of parties with nationalist ideology, 
often manifesting in xenophobic anti-immigrant policy preferences. 
Therefore, their links to right-wing extreme parties of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
early 1990s are evident, which is important since both sets of parties are 
part of a wave of politicized anti-immigrant sentiment in the post-WW II era.  
At the same time, due to failure of ultra-liberalist course, following 
1990, their radical populism and extremism should be distinguished from 
parties with strong roots in ultra-liberalism. These are not the neo-liberal 
free-market parties of the radical right that flourished in the Reagan–
Thatcher era; thus, grouping radical right and neo-nationalist parties 
together is an oversimplification that renders prominent features of the left–
right distinction meaningless.  
The term neo-nationalism is consistent with the parties’ economic 
preferences, as welfare state design is part of national culture. “However, 
since nationalism implies welfare chauvinism in favour of ethnic nationals, 
the term also sets them apart from left-wing parties who may have similar 
but more inclusive policy preferences. Neo-nationalist parties generally 
support the maintenance of social insurance, with preferences for protecting 
or increasing benefits to ethno-nationals, while cutting benefits to out-
groups. Though their policy preferences are welfare chauvinist, they do not 
seek to decrease overall social spending or minimize the role of the 
government in social or economic policy. In this sense, they are not parties 
of the far right, evidenced by the fact that they also attract voters from the 
economic left and from the center. This is important for reasons beyond 
categorization: If anti-immigrant parties’ economic policy preferences are 
shifting, there are important implications for how we understand their 
success. Finally, the term neo-nationalist identifies the parties as having 
nationalist ideologies, but distinguishes them from parties promoting state-
building forms of nationalism.”101 
                                                          




Neo- or ultra-nationalism has no comprehensive economic, political or 
social program. It is rather about extremist or populist slogans or promises, 
which aim at gaining votes and acquiring power. Ultra-nationalism 
demonizes certain global actors (countries, persons or organizations), but 
often it is no more than shadow boxing. It over-dramatizes certain 
development, processes and its consequences (migration, terrorism, global 
competition or simply the trade deficit).  
The ultra-nationalism threatens with the criminalization of certain 
fields of legislation and social regulation (again). This could mean a 
softening of anti-monopoly and anti-corruption jurisdiction or environment 
protection measures, particularly in relation to domestic business. Later 
could entail breaking related international agreements, licensing polluting 
projects of certain domestic business circles, or just cutting the trees. In this 
respect, losing Amazonia as lung of the Earth is a real global threat. Among 
others, these policies, by endangering the health, at the end, can cause 
death of a great number of people.  
Some connect them to the “neo-nationalist desires and partitions 
strategies”, which pose serious threat to integrity even some old established 
Western European nations. “Claims to national self-determination, meaning 
state independence, have affected the stability only of some East European 
countries, such as Ukraine and Georgia, but – quite unexpectedly – also of 
Western Europe, especially some important EU member states, such as the 
United Kingdom, Belgium or Spain.”102   
The process is connected to revival of ethnic disputes and neo-(ultra)-
nationalist trends, but is also reflected in a certain distribution conflict. There 
is a striking similarity among the Catalan, Lombard or Flemish arguments 
as their claims for secession are based on the problem that they pay more 
into the central budget than what they receive. Of course, the problem is not 
that Catalonia or Flanders are obliged to pay higher taxes, their higher tax 
transfers stem automatically from their higher development and 
performance levels. It should be added that the budget transfers are only 
one dimension, in fact, far not the most important one in the balance of 
advantages and disadvantages of any integration. The composite balance 
of all costs and benefits can be totally different from that, and be it Brexit or 
Catalonia, it does not actually support any secession. The populist-
nationalist agitation is only an addition to this trend.  
                                                          




This new wave of disintegration “would have a more comprehensive 
effect, with geopolitical implications for both Western and Eastern Europe. 
Admittedly, however, all of these claims might not necessarily lead to 
independent states.”103 It is important, that contrary to the main line of neo-
nationalism, these partition endeavours, basically are not anti-European, on 
the contrary, Catalans or Scots strongly pledged to EU membership. 
The neo- or ultra-nationalism is hostile and destructive toward 
international integration, says nothing about the new role of the nation state, 
and has no relevant reform program for improving the global or the EU 
regulation. This applies to even those parties or their programs, which do 
not propose leaving the EU by their countries, but only reject some of the 
integration projects (Eurozone joining). 
We should return the excellent analysis of Alan Milward on role of 
nations. “The European Community only evolved as an aspect of that 
national reassertion and without it the reassertion might well have proved 
impossible. To supersede the nation-state would be to destroy the 
Community.”104 It is true other way around. At the present achieved level of 
integration, if the European Community were destroyed that would be the 
end of the modern, 21st century European nation state. Ultra-nationalists 
are enemies not only the EU, but also of their own nation.  
In this respect, the Brexit seems to be a test case and a reminder for 
ultra-national amuck. Brexit has proven that there are only worse options 
than full EU membership; the process might marginalise and even 
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II. Reflections on the future and the reforms of the EU Integration 
(Some Conclusive Remarks) 
 
Need for new and complex theoretical approaches 
The integration theory, following the war, was born in relation to 
emerging European integration. The suggested basic forms of trade 
integration (free trade area, customs union, common market or economic 
union) were applied only later on other continents (LAFTA or South African 
community). The process changed to full steam only in the last decades. 
Besides the “European Studies” the “Comparative Regional Integration 
Studies” became a new discipline. But the integration theory remained 
rather as a discipline on regional issues.  
The concept of integration as certain community formation goes 
beyond the mainstream schools, and extends the analysis into structural 
and historical dimensions. Occasionally, we can meet with the phrase of 
“global” or “national integration”, but there are no comprehensive theories 
behind them. There is a tremendous literature on cities or companies, but it 
is hardly indicated that they can be formed or component of a certain sort of 
integration. It is evident that there are urban or corporate dimensions of the 
European integration processes, but they are analysed without contextual 
approaches. Structurally, these communities exist besides each and other, 
and they are in close interactions and interdependence. The performance of 
the EU or any nation largely determines the state and performance of their 
composing communities and vice versa. Those views, for example, that due 
to globalization, families or nations disappear are basically mistaken, and 
they can put on the wrong track all of the reform thinking and proposals. 
The extension of the integration process into historical dimensions is 
equally important.  
Mainstream integration theories are institutions and policy centred. 
The “integration profiles” extend these theories to the real integration. They 
open up new dimensions of research. The fact, that the UK in real 
economic terms is highly integrated with the EU gives explanation on the 
absurdity of the Brexit, namely there is no alternative to full integration. Any 
break is much worse, than the present situation. Such conclusions do not 
follow from any institutional or policy analyses. It is not by chance that 
dimensions of real-economic integrations are so much neglected by the 




The recent crisis proves that the defects and deficits of integration 
and its governance should be analysed on all its levels. 
The serious consequences of global crisis have been already 
indicated, and the role of global financial crisis in the Euro crisis is also well 
known. About the global regulatory deficits (lack of institutions and policy) 
huge literature could be quoted. 
We should not forget about the local dimensions either. While, for 
example, from integration on the macro-level everybody gains, some 
marginal or particular circles (political or business) may get in loosing 
position. The “Polish plumber”, if working legally, can improve the market 
stability, can be beneficial for the consumer, in general it can increase the 
GDP and the revenues the budget. On the whole, there is no conflict with 
the general national interest. In relation to this, the bankruptcy of some local 
plumbers can be seen a marginal issue.  
In local terms, however, the competition of foreign entrepreneurs or 
workers can be a source of social or political conflicts. Some business may 
bankrupt or unemployment of local peoples may increase. And on the 
whole, it can amount to a “critical mass”, which politically can already 
significantly count (bringing votes for populists). This was typical in case of 
referendum on Brexit. This proves that beyond the national or community 
dimensions, regulation at the local level should not have been neglected. 
It is often claimed that the single market project is fine and that the 
reforms should tackle primarily the sphere of monetary integration. 
However, this is hardly the case. The single labour market was created as 
part of the large-scale opening and liberalization of the markets among only 
12 members. Due to the given circumstances, the community-level social 
frameworks (dimensions of employment and income policies, or social 
partnership) were largely forgotten and the possibilities of corrections on 
local levels were excluded. Later, the Union was enlarged to 27 members 
with highly diverging levels of development and structures. These changes, 
however, were neglected, and in the spirit of ultraliberalism, insisting on 
defending “Community achievements”, correction mechanisms were 
rejected. If the EU had such frameworks, Brexit and many other conflicts 
might have been avoided. Reactions to claims of Cameron were 
contradictory, not enough convincing and too late. 




integration. We know that the main holders and promoters of real-
integration processes are the Transnational Company Networks (controlling 
about 70% of world trade and more than 90% of R&D expenditures). The 
main spatial or organizational frameworks of international integration are 
the major cities, in particular the Global City Networks, which give about 2/3 
of global GDP. They are the major locations of the production, trade and 
finances, company headquarters, major service providers, actors of 
transmission of regulatory conditions, or centres of infrastructure (airport, 
naval ports or railway junctions). Although, all of these have far reaching 
implications on any reform, they are largely beyond the reform 
considerations.  
 
Increased and active role of the “new members” in the reforms  
So far the integration project was largely shaped along the lines of 
interests and the will of old member countries. This applied to all major 
integration projects such as the single market and monetary integration. 
The Eastern enlargements, however, have brought substantial differences 
among the 27 members, which even later on in the decisions were largely 
not taken into account. These differences cut North and South, and East 
and West. 
We refrain from commenting on the relevance of the Maastricht 
criteria for the old member countries. They are more questionable for the 
new members; let it be the inflation targets, the budget deficit or ERMII 
requirements. The most striking example is the demand for balanced 
budget (Fiscal Compound), which is totally irrelevant for a group of 
emerging economies. According to the economic history experiences the 
catching up usually was accompanied with substantial and lasting 
imbalances. They mean normal “prices” for convergence, which is “payed 
back” later by higher level of development and competitiveness. Of course, 
if the debts are consequences of wasteful allocation and exploitation of 
resources, that is a different question. But they should be avoided and not 
the deficits in themselves. The list of special requirements and solutions is 
of course, much longer.  
The differences are not only economical, such as gaps in levels of 
development, competitiveness or incomes. They are historical, cultural, 




even more decisive. 
One important difference, which particularly counts for points of view 
of our analysis, is in the characteristics and the trajectory of nation building 
and consolidation. In the East compared to West, there were about one 
hundred years of belatedness. The process in the East was less organic, 
and in many cases nations were born in the fire of fight for independence. 
In many cases the state frameworks were missing, and they were achieved 
only after 1990.  
Due to belated social development (emergence of capitalism and 
bourgeois society), the missing of the critical number of politically self-
conscious and independent-minded citizens (“citoyen”) was a crucial 
hindering factor of development of modern political nations. The traditions 
of democracy are weaker, democratic political culture is underdeveloped.  
Almost without exception, the states of the East-Europe are multi-
ethnic, and the ethnic conflicts destabilized their national integration. The 
lack of “European” solution of these conflicts is still a democratic deficit of 
the region.   
In some countries the religions (churches) played a positive role in 
fighting for national independence (Poland), in many others religious-
political conflicts historically had self-destructing consequences for their 
nations (protestant-catholic war fares or antisemitism-holocaust). Traditions 
played an important role both in terms of social and political mentalities or 
behaviours. In many countries of the East the corruption is deeply 
embedded into the social and political life, the public rejection of corruption 
is weaker. 
Many of the Western countries were colonial powers, while most of 
the Eastern countries historically for a long time were practically in semi-
colonial or dependent status. That brings differences in tolerance to multi-
cultural society and in understanding its advantages and problems. As a 
result, the migration poses different problems. It is easier to accept others if 
they can speak the language and schooled from similar education systems. 
The crisis, particularly the migration crisis brought these differences into the 
surface, and it proved to be highly divisive. The neglect of the heterogeneity 
of the enlarged union has led to social and political tensions, and they have 




The European integration has its antecedents in cultural, economic or 
political cooperation through many centuries, which survived even the 
bloodiest wars among European nations. We can speak about European 
culture (literature, music or painting), which transcends East or West 
divisions. Intensification of economic and political relations now tends to 
integrate, and surmounting the differences is basic interest of all nations. 
A “multi-speed” Europe or a “variable geometry Europe” are models of 
integration that are not alien even from classic federations (e.g., institutional 
differences between Alberta and Ontario, in Canada). These models are 
already realities of EU development. Only 19 countries are members of the 
Euro-Zone, and its enlargement is not probable in the near future. There 
are 26 countries in Schengen. The UK opted out; Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia are candidates for membership. At the same time, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, Norway (EEA) and Switzerland are associated members of 
the project. The White Paper of March 2017 refers to this as Scenario 3, 
“where certain Member States want to do more in common, one or several 
‘coalition of the willing’ emerge to work together in specific policy areas.”105 
It fits into the concept of “enhanced cooperation”, and should mean nothing 
more than some of the countries taking “the role of the engine” in 
integration processes. 
In light of the substantial differences among the nation states, a multi-
speed Europe is a realistic option, even in the longer run. This model can 
be supported only on the following conditions: 
• it remains open by retaining the possibility for other 
countries to join any time (i.e., it should not mean a “new Iron 
Curtain”);  
• it should not mean any isolation among the members, it 
should seek new forms and channels of transmission; 
• it does not threaten the cohesion of the Union;  
• it preserves the integrity of the acquis communautaire, 
particularly the basic rights, and decision making process; and 
• it maintains the normativity of all major policies. 
Multi-speed Europe means that we are all heading towards the same 
destination, but with a later train, or on a different track. In light of the 
                                                          




substantial differences, this can be a viable option. Variable geometry 
versions carry more danger. If we follow different aims then we can easily 
find ourselves on a train that is going nowhere.  
„Assuming that the future will be a multi-speed Europe, it is evident 
that for us the only relevant and exemplary objective could be to belong to 
the core at all costs as soon as possible. We should do everything to stick 
on this core, and to use its gravitational power for our rising.” 106 
All parties agree, that the European Union is a uniquely special and 
complex entity without precedent in the past. As far as the future is 
concerned, “the Union remains an integrative venture whose final 
destination is yet to become discernible.”107  It is still a sort of halfway house 
between federal and confederal structures, a “partial polity” or “part-formed 
political system”, a “betweenness” which is still in a “grey area” between the 
national and the supranational state. “The Union remains an unresolved 
social scientific puzzle with an ‘open finalité politique’.”108  It is a “baffling 
mixture” of federal and intergovernmental properties 109   and “the most 
complex polity that human agency has ever devised”. 110   
Even if we do not know the ending of the story, it can be reasonably 
presumed that the EU’s future lies in a federal configuration. But, about the 
question, in what concrete forms and when could it be realized, the opinions 
are deeply divided. Should it be just a loser confederation or even just 
nothing more than “ever closer Union”, remain open.  
It seems, at the moment, that a centralised form of federation in 
Europe is out of the question, but various forms of multinational federal 
structures can be acceptable. “It presumed the protection, preservation and 
promotion of distinct sub-state nations that would be able to determine 
themselves as nations within the larger federal state.”111 This federation or 
confederation should seek to preserve the culturally and nationally 
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heterogeneous character of the continent, and at the same time it should 
consider “sub-state nations” as the basic resource of its development. 
Nevertheless, such a scenario should not entail the elimination of nations; it 
could rather support their development, along with adjusted national 
structures.  
A solid federation should be based on organic and democratic 
development. The main stages in the federation of the American states are 
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the conclusion of the 
Civil War. Nevertheless, the federation itself emerged very gradually, and 
consolidated by developments such as the emergence of the American 
industry, the internal market, the construction of railways across the 
Continent, the harmonisation of banking and financial markets, or the 
creation of a national highway network. This evolutionary path of 
development will hopefully apply to the EU as well.  Only a fully democratic 
federation can have a solid future.  
The enforced surrender of national identities and interests is an 
unacceptable option. Europe, in terms of its diversity, is ”deeply divided 
continent”. “Its own geographical, political, economic, cultural and national 
multi-colourity, is one of the most characteristic distinctive mark of Europe. 
As result, in spite of already seventy years of integration efforts, the 
common European identity, the unified European society and European 
public opinion could not be born, and the European political community 
could not be formed. Without this to speak about federal Europe, and to 
create it, is nothing else than an adventurous, dangerous venture, even 
more a sheer illusion.”112 We had impressive progress, but the recent crisis 
proved the vulnerability of EU cohesion. In fact, for nations coming out of an 
oppressive federation is not easy to join immediately an evolving new one, 
even if it offers to guarantee all of its democratic aspirations. 
 
National adjustment (re-integration) as a strategic issue 
The national adjustment (internal re-integration) is a basic component 
of the new stage of integrational integration. This means a strategic up 
grading the importance of the nations in the international integration 
processes. This is the main point and the conclusion of this paper. 
                                                          




In structural terms, this adjustment is based on market forces, but it 
can be supported by several policy factors. These national policy 
adjustments assume appropriate “policy mixes”. The following areas are 
strategically particularly important: 
• structural or innovation policies;  
• development of infrastructure and the quality of human 
capital (education, training and health);  
• social and employment policies (the single market has 
already called for this),  
• income and social partnership policies (supporting price 
stability);  
• social, regional and welfare policies (for coping with social 
and regional inequities) 
As the experience of the last two decades showed, that the failure of 
internal transformation and restructuring, the deficiency of national policy 
adjustments played prominent role in the recent crisis of European 
integration. These deficiencies could be identified both in terms of setting 
policy priorities and choosing the proper new “policy mixes”. 
In the last decades, the EU member countries in their adjustments 
showed quite mixed, and in general, disappointing performance. One of the 
typical examples of failures was underestimation or negligence of the role 
and importance of development and structural policies. It became clear that 
neither strict common monetary policies, nor market mechanisms could 
automatically increase competitiveness. Economic development always 
depends on the interests and behaviours of the main actors, from 
entrepreneurs to governments. Cheaper money can be spent on innovation, 
development or re-structuring of the economy (Germany). But it could also 
be used for increasing incomes, for buying votes (Greece) or investing in 
real estate speculation (Ireland).  
Most governments neglected the importance of responsible income 
policy by breaking the link between incomes and productivity. This led to 
negative consequences from the point of view of competitiveness and 
contributed to budgetary problems. Theories in the optimal currency area 
assume that exchange rate correction mechanisms are replaced by flexible 
factor incomes, including wages and interest rates. No one recognised the 
importance of income policies neither at the national or EU level. At least 




Bundesbank could count on the well-established cooperation between the 
trade unions and business organizations. 
Concerning the national adjustment, the so far largely negligent 
attitudes should be replaced by strategic thinking and more cooperative 
policies. Only conscious national transformation strategies and policies can 
align the nations with the challenges and opportunities of international 
integration.  
From the point of view of successful adjustment, three main policy 
priorities are important: competitiveness, maximal exploitation of the 
benefits of integration and convergence.  
The new stage of integration, based on a single market and monetary 
union means the full opening of markets, upgrades to the importance of 
competitiveness, and puts new adjustment constraints on individuals, 
companies and national policies as well.  
All these increase the importance of innovation, education and 
training, care about health, development of infrastructure and their 
supporting policies. In international integration, competitiveness means not 
only globally competitive companies and sectors, but also a competitive 
national middle class and political elite. If it fails in adjustment, more 
precisely, if its political elite proves to be incompetent and unable to defend 
the interests of its country, that is a serious blow from the point of view of 
success of the nation.  Innovative thinking and mentality should pervade the 
whole society. 
 From points of view of individuals, the quality of education, and the 
possibilities of training or re-training are important. The same applies to the 
access to a high level of health service, and in general to all public services. 
Integration supposes changing the public mentalities, and such heritages as 
inward looking attitudes, suspicion toward change and otherness or 
intolerance should be overcome. 
For company sector, for the longer run, investment and 
entrepreneurship friendly atmosphere are needed through eliminating 
bureaucracy and corruption with transparent and calculable policies.  
While encouraging foreign investments, particular attention should be 
given to local small and medium sized companies. The success of SME, 




transnational company attitudes in their own right, are basic indicators and 
factors of competitiveness of a country.  
In terms of convergence, the performance of new members remained 
contradictory. In the last two decades, concerning per capita GDP, all the 
members were catching up substantially, although, the individual 
performances were quite differing. This was, however, on the large extent, 
re-convergence. In the 1960s, Hungary’s per capita GDP was around 60% 
of the developed West, a gap, which was similar at the end of the 19th 
century. By 1990s, this share fell to around 40%, which was a spectacular 
failure of the bureaucratic central planning systems (lost war of “peaceful 
competition”). The present 67% level of the per capita Hungarian GDP of 
the EU average, means the about same 60% of the developed centrum 
(Austria). 
While this roughly corresponds to the differences in productivity 
(70%), in several relations that differences are more substantial. Compared 
to 70% level of Hungarian average productivity of the German or the French 
ones, differences in level of minimum wages are three times higher in the 
two countries than in Hungary. We find the same differences in terms of 
general levels of wages or pensions. The differences proved to be annoying 
in relation to Greece and the Greek crisis as well. While the level of 
productivity is roughly the same in Greece, Hungary or Czech Republic, 
even after the austerity measure in Greece, the level of minimal wages or 
pensions remained above the level of the two Central European countries.  
These have very negative impacts on the cohesion of the Union. 
Convergence in terms of regional or social terms is highly controversial.  
From points of view of social stability and cohesion, it is assumed, 
that the benefits of integration are socially fairly distributed. Namely, 
overwhelming parts of society should feel beneficiary on integration. We are 
far from that, and it is clear that the process should not be let just for the 
market. 
Global integration and global capitalism co-exists, in their functioning 
they cannot be separated. Their co-habitation, nevertheless, proved to be 
the source of serious conflicts. Many of the negative developments 
(increase of extreme inequalities) are the results of global capitalism, rather 
than that of integration processes. The roots of present cohesion and 





There is an agreement that for addressing the cohesion crisis and the 
restoration of the social stability, broad social reforms are needed. That 
assumes the reform and upgrading of existing social models, both in 
national and community dimensions.  
In the 1950s and 60s, the welfare state proved to be successful in 
dealing with inter-class conflicts. Strong tax progressiveness effectively 
moderated the harsh income inequalities and created a relative social 
peace. It should not be forgotten, however, that this happened in a bipolar 
world. 
In the past decades, with the emergence of knowledge- and 
competition-based societies, the classic welfare state, based on 
paternalistic distributions, became largely unattainable and obsolete. The 
progressiveness of taxation penalises performance and hits particularly 
those middle classes that carry the whole of society on their shoulders, 
while they are most exposed to the uncertainties of globally competing 
societies. It was not without a reason that countries chose moderation of 
the progressiveness of their tax systems, sometimes adopting single rate 
taxation.  
The Lisbon Treaty pledged itself to a “competitive social market 
economy”, as a desirable model of an integrated European economy. In a 
study published not long ago, I agreed with this aim, but I have proposed to 
add the adjectives of “democratic” and “eco-social” ones. 113  The 
“democratic” adjective refers to need striving for fair competition (anti-
monopoly legislation) and fighting against corruption. Meantime, we should 
remind us on Göteborg decisions on environmental protection. So far the 
pledge remained a declaration without further elaboration. The redefinition 
of the notion of social state according to the challenges of the 21st century 
would be highly desirable. 
The concept of social market economy gives priority to market 
mechanisms, places emphasis on private responsibility and individual 
efforts to increase the welfare of society. It aims to improve the 
competitiveness of the broadest section of society, and instead of income 
guarantees and redistribution, it supports services, which bare the 
preconditions of improving the economic and social positions of individuals. 
                                                          





It assumes high-quality education, training and health care, desirably 
adjusted to personal needs and abilities. The redistribution is thus limited to 
a smaller section of society only, particularly to those in need and the 
handicapped.  
Social policies still belong to the competences of national authorities, 
but community dimensions should not be neglected either. Clearly, a 
“European” social market economy would be largely the question of 
harmonisation and coordination; and due to differences in development 
levels or in social and cultural circumstances, nationally the substantial 
differences would remain. Social convergence is a basic prerequisite of 
overcoming cohesion crisis. Well-functioning and efficient social systems 
are required on both the national and the Union levels. 
This new European social model can be certain combination of a 
reformed welfare state and social market economy. Thus, they should form 
an integral part of any discussion on the future of Europe and EU 
integration. 
It is becoming more and more evident that the role, the position and 
the stability of nations (that is, national integrations) are crucial from the 
perspective of the normal development of the international system as a 
whole. The stability of international systems, inclusive of international 
integration, assumes the existence of strong and democratic nations that 
are ready to accept cultural and ethnic diversity. The EU in this respect 
should play the role of a catalyst, both within the Union and also among its 
neighbours. Understanding the organic character and coherence of 
integration processes is in fact vital from the point of view of any serious 
reform program.  
In the future stability of integration and its effective governance the 
nations play a strategic role. The magic word is adjustment and cooperation 
of the member nations. This assumes constructive national attitudes and 
policies. An open, cooperative, inclusive and competitive nations form an 
integral part of a contemporary integrated system. Accordingly, what we 
need are transformed and adjusted nations, which are able to face the 
challenges of international integration in the 21st century. Through that, they 
can increase their importance. The success or failure of national adjustment 
(internal re-integration) equally determines the development and well-being 
of the given nation, and that of the whole Union. It assumes competent and 





It became clear, that nations do not disappear in the foreseeable 
future, but they are fundamentally changed and different, both in their role 
and functioning as they were even just 50 years ago. What is eroding, that 
is the classical national state, and what needs to be rejected is archaic 
nationalism, which seems to be in the revival all over the world. 
As a repercussion of the crisis, the spectre of ultra-nationalism is 
haunting Europe again. The ultra-nationalist, the extreme populist policies 
are not just a sort of negative sum games. They threaten with more; they 
can set back Europe for decades, and as Brexit indicates can impose 
damages which can be repaired only through tremendous sacrifices. Ultra-
nationalism is self-destructive, it is against the basic interests of not only the 
others, but also the own nation. That is one of the main challenges for 
democratic political forces for the coming decades.  
The prospects of reforms are not encouraging. “Looking at the 
growing cacophony, however, skepticism is likely to prevail in public 
expectations. For almost a decade, the behavior of Europe as a whole, 
including both its communitarian institutions and member states, has 
manifested mentally and politically an unpreparedness to challenges of 
societal fusion and the new amalgamation in progress. Democracy, as a 
tool able to accommodate and represent the diversities and pluralities of 
social realities, might become a victim of the process of renationalization of 
territorial units and of partition. The result may be exposure to the risk of 
new wars, rather than enhanced guarantees for peaceful perspectives.”114  
The reforms assume political and legal changes. These changes are 
so complex that it is hardly possible without reshaping the basic institutional 
and policy framework. We agree that we need a new treaty of the Union, 
which should bring fundamental changes its all dimensions. New members 
should be active participants of these processes, which would need to 
assume the will and determination of all parties, and should conform to the 
common norms and values of Europe. Europe has all the political, 
professional or financial potentials to address all of these challenges. 
The reform should not be an elite venture. It needs to be democratic, 
based on broad agreement and support of civil society and citizens. 
“Europe’s future depends not just on governments putting forward the right 
                                                          




policies, but on the capacity of democracies to bring about peaceful 
change. If the burden gets too heavy, the political system collapses.”115 
Sustainable growth is needed for sustainable financial stability, but this 
assumes sustainable social and political stability as well. 
The role of the media in supporting integration would be highly 
important and crucial. So far it has been proved to be controversial and it 
had played rather a negative role. In this respect, according to a study 
analysing the media’s role of euro adoption in Central Europe is very 
typical. In Poland, “the media is also not very interested in the euro 
accession process. Attention on this issue picks up when something 
happens with exchange rate of the zloty or the euro. Otherwise the euro 
accession policy is not attracting very much attention.”116 The same applies 
to the Czech Republic and Hungary. The media follows the euro exchange 
rate fluctuation, but otherwise is not interested about the question. In one 
sense, we can state, that there is no media for euro in the three countries, 
promoting a real and professional discussion about the pros and cons. As 
politicians are afraid of losing votes, they refrain, particularly during the 
election campaign, even to mention of the issue. In reality, reporting only 
about the crisis problems means practically a continuous negative 
campaign, which means that the public gets only negative information. This 
can be applied to the presentation of the whole integration process. 
Besides, the official national media tend to present all successes as that of 
their governments, while all bad things come from Brussels. These all apply 
not only to the euro, but to the attitudes and policies concerning the whole 
process of integration. 
The EU has no agenda for any qualitative progress of its integration 
program, which would go beyond the present constructions of the Single 
Market and the EMU. Even the consolidating reform projects, like union 
budget or solution of debt crisis are uncertain. The popular support for any 
such program is just missing. Instead of neo-functionalist spill over, we face 
the possibility of a post-functionalist backlash. All these make constructive 
reforms more than urgent and important. 
 
                                                          
115  The Economist, 12 November 2011 “Staring into the abyss, Special Report on Europe and its 
Currency”, p.6) 
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